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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
GOVERNMENT CAPACITY  
AND THE ACQUISITION, IMPLEMENTATION, AND IMPACT OF ARRA FUNDS  
by 
NakHyeok Choi 
Florida International University, 2016 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Howard Frank, Co-Major Professor 
Professor Hai Guo, Co-Major Professor 
This dissertation examined transportation grants provided to states under the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA). Some states acquired more grants and 
utilized them in a timelier manner than others. This dissertation examined why this is the 
case, utilizing System Theory and Resource Based Theory as the intellectual framework. 
Human resource and financial resource capacities were viewed as the principal drivers of 
success and studying this managerially controllable variables underpin the analysis. 
 Though many studies have examined ARRA since 2009, my dissertation is the first 
to simultaneously examine the three stages of the ARRA transportation grant process: 
acquisition, implementation, and impact. There are three research questions, aligned with 
the three stages: (1) what factors affect state governments in the acquisition of competitive 
grants? (2) what factors affect state governments in the implementation of competitive and 
vi 
formula grants? and (3) what factors affect state governments in expenditure recovery and 
transportation investment? 
 Government Capacity consists of four components, namely human resources, 
financial resources, general management, and experience. I used three regression models 
(log-linear for the first, and panel corrected standard error for the last two) to test the impact 
of the government capacity on grant acquisition, implementation, and impact. Overall, the 
test results showed that three dimensions of government capacity played a significant role 
to varying extents with respect to ARRA: human resource, financial resource, and 
experience.  
 States with higher government capacity [strength (S) of capacity] turned the threat 
(T) of the Great Recession into an opportunity (O) for the restoration and development of 
transportation, and compensated for their weakness (W). The dissertation concluded that 
specific aspects of Government Capacity were thus relevant predictors of the acquisition, 
implementation, and impact of ARRA grants. Findings also support prior research that 
quality, not quantity of personnel may of signal import to organizational capacity during 
times of fiscal stress. 
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Chapter I. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Motivation of the dissertation 
Government Capacity (GC) is a pivotal ability for governments to perform their policy. 
GC, defined as the ability of government, was characterized as human resource, financial 
resource, intelligent decision, management, system, etc., according to several studies 
(Bowman & Kearney, 1988; Donahue, Selden, & Ingraham, 2000; Honadle, 1981). 
Adapting and developing the concept of GC, many descendant studies reported that the 
performance of government (organization) depends on GC (e.g., Christensen & Gazley, 
2008; Hall, 2008b; Hou & Moynihan, 2008; Howlett, 2009). These studies argue that 
governments with more capacity are likely to outperform other governments with less 
capacity. 
 As such, the significance of GC seems to be undebatable in the field of public 
administration. However, there are several points that have not been clearly established. 
How does GC work in crisis situations? Which components of GC work well (and which 
do not work well)? Many studies have focused on GC, but few have focused on the role of 
GC in overcoming crisis. Moreover, although many studies have presented components of 
GC, few empirical studies have proposed a systemic framework for components of GC.   
 In these respects, the present dissertation utilizes the most recent economic crisis, 
the Great Recession (December 2007- June 2009), and the Recovery Act as a U.S. policy, 
to investigate the role of state government capacity in a crisis. The Recession is an 
appropriate case for testing state government capacity because it universally impacted all 
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states; however, there was variability in recovery across states after the federal policy was 
enacted. 
 More specifically, the Recession jeopardized state governments in that states faced 
considerable and abrupt revenue cuts. The severe fiscal distress threatened the states’ 
abilities to provide core public services and to invest in economic development. However, 
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), enacted to remedy the 
serious situation with a stimulus package, helped mitigate the fiscal distress. No state 
economy was immune to the effects of the Great Recession, and the ARRA simultaneously 
provided every state with an opportunity for economic relief.   
 The dissertation examines the aforementioned situation and investigates ARRA 
grants. Some states acquired more grants and some states implemented grant-funded 
programs better than others. Additionally, regarding the ARRA objective to recover 
government expenditure and to increase investment in transportation, this study examines 
why some states performed better than others in transportation expenditure recovery and 
transportation investment. This dissertation aims to explain this variability using GC 
components as independent variables. 
 In the next sections, I introduce ARRA and the ARRA transportation grants, 
propose a schematic model and research questions with hypotheses, present the 
significance of study, and describe the organizational structure of the dissertation. 
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1.2. ARRA and transportation grants 
 The present study examines transportation grants from the U.S. Department of 
Transportation (DOT) under ARRA (also referred to as the Recovery Act). The reason why 
the dissertation takes ARRA transportation grant as the case of the study is that research on 
this grant remains scarce. Many studies have examined ARRA in terms of its effects (e.g., 
Chodorow-Reich, Feiveson, Liscow, & Woolston, 2012; Cogan, Cwik, Taylor, & Wieland, 
2010; Conley & Dupor, 2013; Johnson, 2009; Manna & Ryan, 2011; McGuinn, 2012), but 
transportation investment—an aim of the Recovery act—has received comparatively scant 
attention in the research literature. So, it is meaningful to research how ARRA 
transportation funds were distributed; how the funds were implemented by recipients; and 
how effective the funds were in transportation expenditure recovery and transportation 
investment at the recipient level. Before starting the presentation of the research, the next 
section briefly introduces ARRA and ARRA transportation grant programs to provide 
background of the case. 
 
1.2.1. ARRA grants 
 The goal of ARRA was to spur economic activity during the Great Recession. 
Specific aims of the act include job preservation and creation, economic recovery, 
investment in transportation and infrastructure, and relieving subnational government 
fiscal stress to provide essential services. To achieve these goals, the federal government 
distributed funds to states and localities through several grant programs (Wyatt, 2009, p. 
128). As of 2009, more than half of the ARRA funds (63%) were used for Medicaid, 
3 
another 13% of the funds were allocated to State Fiscal Stabilization Funds, and 24% of 
the funds were allocated to other programs (United States Government Accountability 
Office, 2009). Drawing from the portion (24%) allocated to other programs, 28 federal 
agencies provided several grant programs to subnational governments. This dissertation 
focuses on the grant programs—specifically, the funds distributed by the U.S. Department 
of Transportation (DOT).   
 The ARRA grant programs were categorized into two types: a formula based grant 
and a competitive grant (or a discretionary grant). Competitive grant programs were 
distributed to recipients at the discretion of each federal agency. Formula grants were 
allocated by a formula with pre-determined multiple criteria. Competitive grants are useful 
in that recipient governments can apply for and acquire the grants according to their own 
plan created to meet their unique needs. However, the grant competition demands 
significant costs for preparing grant applications, even though the dollar-amounts of these 
grants are much lower than those of formula grants. For example, a total of $47 billion was 
distributed by the federal DOT to state level recipients under the Recovery act—$34 billion 
was designated for formula and block grants and $12 billion was designated for 
discretionary grants. The distributed amount and number of grants vary considerably across 
the U.S. states. This study distinguishes the two grant programs in the context of an 
investigation of ARRA grants. 
 In terms of the impact of ARRA, it has been evaluated as a successful policy. 
Scheppach (2012) stated that “ARRA was quite effective” because the act was a well-timed 
intervention compared to most previous fiscal policy. ARRA funds were disbursed to 
4 
“stabilize both the aggregate economy and state spending” in a timely manner. Without the 
subsidized funds, “states would have had both to cut spending and to increase taxes 
substantially more” due to the balanced budget rules during the severe period of revenue 
cutback triggered by the market shock. So, ARRA played a significant role in preventing a 
pro-cyclical situation and a deeper and longer recession (p. 948). 
 
1.2.2. ARRA transportation grant 
 This dissertation examines transportation grants under ARRA. The term, 
transportation “comprises the functions of Highways, Air transportation, Parking facilities, 
Water transport and terminals, and Transit subsidies.” 1  The Recovery Act describes 
specific transportation programs of ARRA grants: competitive and formula grants. 
Competitive grant programs of DOT are (1) Supplemental Discretionary Grants for a 
National Surface Transportation System, (2) Highway Infrastructure Investment, (3) 
Grants-in-aid for Airports, (4) Supplemental Grants for Assistance to Small Shipyards, (5) 
Capital Investment Grants, (6) Capital Assistance for High Speed Rail Corridors and 
Intercity Passenger Rail Service, and (7) Capital Grants to the National Railroad Passenger 
Corporation. Formula grant programs of DOT are (1) Fixed Guideway Infrastructure 
Investment, (2) Transit Capital Assistance, and (3) Highway Infrastructure Investment. A 
category of the Highway Infrastructure Investment program includes both a competitive 
and a formula grant. 
1 https://www.census.gov/govs/state/definitions.html 
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 Table 1 Status of Recovery Act Transportation Projects, Obligations, and Expenditures 
 
Number of projects            
 
Obligations  
(in millions) 
 
Expenditures 
(in millions) 
Program Awarded Completed 
 
Amount Percent 
obligated 
 
Amount Percent 
reimbursed 
Federal Highway Administration 
      
Highway 
infrastructure 
investment 
12,931 8,124 
 
$26,335  99.90% 
 
$19,550 74.20% 
Federal Railroad Administration 
      
High speed 
intercity 
passenger rail 
78 0 
 
5,671 71.1 
 
200 3.5 
Amtrak 154 110 
 
1,291 100.0 
 
1,291 100.0 
Federal Transit Administration 
      
Transit capital 
assistance 
program 
(TCAP) 
1,010 170 
 
7,294 100.0 
 
4,567 62.6 
Fixed 
guideway 
infrastructure 
51 24 
 
743 100.0 
 
468 63 
Capital 
investment 
grants 
11 11 
 
743 100.0 
 
743 100.0 
Office of the Secretary of Transportation 
    
TIGER grants 51 0 
 
1,482 98.8 
 
104 7.0 
Federal Aviation Administration 
     
Grants-in-aid 
for airports 
372 365 
 
1,086 98.9 
 
1,055 97.1 
FAA facilities 
and equipment 
399 381 
 
198 99.0 
 
143 72.2 
Maritime Administration 
     
Assistance to 
small 
shipyards 
70 36 
 
98 100.0 
 
79 80.6 
Total 15,127 9,221 
 
44,941 95.0 
 
28,200 62.7 
Note. Values in the table are as of May 31, 2011.  
Source: United States Government Accountability Office (2011, p. 8) 
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 The Recovery Act, Title XII, states that six federal agencies of DOT operate 
different kinds of programs. Table 1 above describes detailed information of ARRA 
transportation grant by agency, regarding transportation projects, obligations, and 
expenditures. First, the Office of the Secretary distributed $1.5 billion for Supplemental 
Discretionary Grants for a National Surface Transportation System, which was used for 
capital investments in surface transportation infrastructure. Second, the Federal Aviation 
Administration operates two programs: “Supplemental Funding for Facilities and 
Equipment” ($200 million) and “Grants-In-Aid for Airports” ($1.1 billion). “Supplemental 
Funding for Facilities and Equipment” is used for necessary investments in the Federal 
Aviation Administration infrastructure: power systems, air route traffic control centers, air 
traffic control towers, terminal radar approach control facilities, and navigation and landing 
equipment. “Grants-In-Aid for Airports” is for installation and commissioning of runway 
incursion prevention devices and systems at airports. Third, the Federal Highway 
Administration carries out the “Highway Infrastructure Investment” program, in which 
$27.5 billion was distributed, and the funds were used for highway restoration, repair, 
construction, and other activities. Fourth, the Federal Railroad Administration managed 
two programs: “Capital Assistance for High Speed Rail Corridors and Intercity Passenger 
Rail Service,” with $8 billion, supports the development of intercity high speed rail service; 
and “Capital Grants to the National Railroad Passenger Corporation,” with $1.3 billion, 
was used for the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), for repair, 
rehabilitation, or upgrade of railroad assets or infrastructure. Fifth, the Federal Transit 
Administration has three programs, which are “Transit Capital Assistance” ($6.9 billion), 
7 
“Fixed Guideway Infrastructure Investment”2 ($750 million), and “Capital Investment 
Grants” ($750 million) for additional discretionary programs. Sixth, the Maritime 
Administration manages the “Supplemental Grants for Assistance to Small Shipyards” 
with $100 million.  
 The Recovery Act has a restriction provision for state governments to use DOT 
funds. The “Maintenance of Effort” (MOE) provision3 regulates states to spend a certain 
amount of funds that are from their own sources. If a state fails to meet the MOE, the state 
will be restricted from receiving additional funds from DOT in the future.4 
 
 
 
 
2 “A ‘fixed guideway’ refers to any transit service that uses exclusive or controlled rights-of-way or 
rails, entirely or in part. The term includes heavy rail, commuter rail, light rail, monorail, trolleybus, 
aerial tramway, inclined plane, cable car, automated guideway transit, ferryboats, that portion of motor 
bus service operated on exclusive or controlled rights-of-way, and high-occupancy-vehicle (HOV) 
lanes.” (http://www.transportation.gov/livability/grants-programs#Fixed Guide Systems) 
3 “The Governor of the State shall certify to the Secretary of Transportation that the State will maintain 
its effort with regard to State funding for the types of projects that are funded by the appropriation. As 
part of this certification, the Governor shall submit to the Secretary of Transportation a statement 
identifying the amount of funds the State planned to expend from State sources as of the date of 
enactment of this Act during the period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act through 
September 30, 2010, for the types of projects that are funded by the appropriation.” (Sec. 1201. (a), the 
Recovery Act) 
4 “If a State is unable to maintain the level of effort certified pursuant to subsection (a), the State will 
be prohibited by the Secretary of Transportation from receiving additional limitation pursuant to the 
redistribution of the limitation on obligations for Federal-aid highway and highway safety construction 
programs that occurs after August 1 for fiscal year 2011.” (Sec. 1201. (b), the Recovery Act) 
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1.3. Schematic Model, research question and hypothesis 
 In this section, I will briefly describe the schematic model to provide the logic flow 
of the dissertation and present research questions and hypotheses. Detailed explanations of 
the logic and research questions will follow in Chapters III and IV.  
 As explained in the motivation section, this dissertation began with the intellectual 
curiosity of why there was variability among states in terms of grant acquisition, 
implementation, and impact. To explain the variability, I focus on government capacity 
(GC), generally regarded as a significant factor for government performance.   
 Specifically, the purpose of this study is to investigate the three stages of the ARRA 
grants process: grant acquisition, implementation, and impact. I investigate (1) what affects 
state governments in the acquisition of competitive grants; (2) what affects state 
governments in the implementation of competitive and formula grants; and (3) what affects 
state governments in expenditure recovery and spending.   
 The major explanatory variable is government capacity (GC), which is expected 
to play an essential role as an independent variable to explain the three stages of ARRA 
grants. In addition to GC, several other factors affect the grant process. The schematic 
model (Figure 1) below depicts the logic flow of this dissertation, specific factors, and the 
relation between the factors and the explained variables. 
 The fundamental logic is based on Systems theory; that is, indicating 
input/throughput decides output. The study regards the three outputs (grant acquisition, 
implementation and impact) as performance, and the input/throughput factors as the drivers 
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of performance. In the model below, the border lines indicate boundaries of the system. 
Rectangular lines surround the internal system—in which GC, state politics, fiscal 
institution, and legislative control are explanatory variables for the outputs. Outside of the 
system, the outputs are also affected by state needs, federal politics, and federal grants. 
However, compared to internal factors, external factors are too difficult for state 
governments to manage. In Chapter III, I present specific components of these factors by 
applying the Resource Based Theory (RBT). 
 
 
Figure 1 Schematic Model 
 
 To investigate the three stage of ARRA transportation grant, I propose three 
research questions and related hypotheses. Detailed explanations of each rationale per 
question will be presented in Chapter IV. 
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Research question 1: Why do some states receive more ARRA grants than others and 
to what extent does this depend on government capacity? 
Research question 2: Does government capacity affect the implementation of ARRA 
grants? If so, to what extent? 
Research question 3: To what extent did ARRA grant aid affect the transportation 
expenditure recovery and state transportation investments?  
H1. Governments with higher capacity would receive a greater amount of ARRA 
competitive grants. 
H2. Governments with higher capacity would implement a greater proportion of 
obligated ARRA grants within the first two years.  
H3a. ARRA grants will positively affect the transportation expenditure recovery 
(Recovery impact).  
H3b. ARRA grants will impact the transportation investment (Reinvestment 
impact). 
 
1.4. Significance of Study 
 The dissertation is significant in terms of several contributions to the research 
literature and to practitioners. First, the study proposes a theoretical framework for the 
association between government capacity (GC) and performance. Prior literature has 
mostly sidestepped the theory development of GC, instead depending on practical 
11 
approaches or on authors’ intuition and experience. By utilizing Systems Theory and 
Resource Based Theory (RBT), I devise a framework of logic flow to explain the relation 
between GC and ARRA transportation grants. 
 Second, I propose the concept and the measurement of GC based on the theoretical 
framework. Most prior empirical studies employed a proxy for GC—without suggesting a 
relevant theory, merely citing other articles. Moreover, some of previous literature avoided 
theoretical explanations for why their measurement components represent GC. Based on 
RBT, I propose a framework to capture the concept and the components of GC.    
 Third, this dissertation is the first study to examine the three stages of ARRA 
transportation funds: acquisition, implementation, and impact. So far, few studies on 
ARRA transportation grants have been published, though some policy areas of the ARRA 
have been studied; for example, energy funds (Carley, Nicholson-Crotty, & Fisher, 2015; 
Terman & Feiock, 2014), education (Nicholson-Crotty & Staley, 2012), and total funds 
(Young & Sobel, 2013). Thus, this dissertation on ARRA transportation grants can also 
contribute to transportation policy studies.  
 Lastly, this study suggests several policy implications for practitioners. I provide 
some evidence of GC’s importance in ARRA grant competition and implementation. This 
is a policy implication for practitioners in that GC is effective even in crisis; individuals 
and organizations must continue to enhance capacity even during times of calm. Moreover, 
I find statistically significant evidence concerning the effects of grants on state 
expenditures—though the effect differed according to the type of grant and to the type of 
12 
expenditure. The results may provide advice on the usefulness of grant type in different 
types of expenditure. 
 
1.5. Organization of the dissertation 
 The dissertation consists of six chapters. The next chapter presents a 
comprehensive literature review in three parts—according to the three research 
questions—and critiques gaps in the literature. Chapter III proposes theory development, 
in which I present the framework, based on two background theories (Systems Theory and 
RBT), to explain the link between GC and performance regarding ARRA transportation 
grants. In addition, the study conceptualizes government capacity by referring to previous 
literature and presents a framework for the concept and components of GC. Chapter IV 
describes the three models for the three research questions, in which I present estimation 
routines and data. Chapter V unpacks the empirical results of the models. Finally, Chapter 
VI presents a summary of the dissertation, a discussion of the results, and the limitations 
of the study. 
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Chapter II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Chapter II presents three groups of the research literature reviews, organized into three 
sections dedicated to grant acquisition, grant implementation, and grant impact. First, a 
review of the literature on grant acquisition is presented—divided into two groups of 
studies: the public administration literature focusing on government capacity (GC) and the 
political science literature focusing on federal politics. Second, several studies are reviewed 
that focus on the relationship between government capacity and grant (or policy) 
implementation. The discussion includes research that accounts for how and why GC is 
important in policy implementation and includes studies that analyze the role of GC 
specifically in ARRA implementation. Lastly, regarding empirical analysis of grant impact, 
I present basic economic theories of grant impact on governments and determinants on 
government expenditure.  
 
2.1. Literature review on Grant acquisition 
 Prior research has provided useful insights into why some governments receive 
more grant money than others, yet some important factors have not been studied 
sufficiently. Most political science studies on grant allocation have mainly focused on the 
effect of political factors on the outcomes of grant cycles. Scholars have examined the 
federal politics of pork barrel projects (i.e., projects in which government money has been 
appropriated specifically to bring money to a representative's district)—using the following 
main explanatory variable: number of congressmen from each state on the relevant 
committees  (e.g., Evans, 1994; Lazarus & Steigerwalt, 2009; Young & Sobel, 2013). 
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However, the role of subnational governments has been largely neglected, despite their 
active involvement in the development of grant projects.  
 The following sections review the public administration literature on government 
capacity (GC) and the political science literature on federal politics.  
 
2.1.1. Government capacity for federal fund attainment 
 Several public administration studies have focused on the role of government 
capacity pertaining to grant allocation. The studies argued that level of government 
capacity affects the acquisition of federal funds. Investigating federalism, Manna and Ryan 
(2011) asserted that applicants’ capacities increase the possibility of winning grant 
competitions. The authors presented three key factors for operating competitive grant 
programs: “applicant capacity, applicant need5, and politics6” (p. 533). Results of the 
regression models indicated that government capacity variables had positive effects on 
submitted applications, and that population and education budget positively affected grant 
proposal scores. The authors concluded that government capacity is an important variable. 
Regarding grant acquisition, Johnson (2009, p. 124) asserted that government capacity is 
important to the search for eligible grants and the application preparation process. Johnson 
reported that staffs of low capacity municipalities spent significant time just to determine 
5 The variable, states’ ‘need’ was measured by the percentage cut to the state education budget and 
poverty rate. 
6  The variable, ‘politics,’ was operationalized as the party affiliation of the governor, with the 
expectation that Republican governors are less likely to seek federal money. 
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whether or not their governments were eligible to apply for a competitive grant. It implies 
government capacity (or capability) would play an essential role in the preparation of 
application and in the achievement of the grant. Collins and Gerber (2008) compared 
government capacity and local needs to determine which factor was more important in 
predicting fund allocation. Using data analysis, they asserted that higher administrative 
capacity was “a consistent driver of funding allocation” (p. 1137).   
 What can be a rationale about why government capacity (GC) is significant on 
grant application and allocation? Some scholars have suggested that GC is a good means 
by which grantors can screen out disqualified applicants and also a good point for grantees 
to induce grantors’ decision. Terman and Feiock (2014) asserted that “grantors use capacity 
as one means to discriminate between governments that are more or less likely to succeed 
in carrying out the goals of the grant” (p. 6). Moreover, Collins and Gerber (2008) 
presented their rationales for why higher level of administrative capacity is critical to grant 
procurement, focusing specifically on search costs and monitoring costs. Grantors aim to 
fund successful programs; grantors should mitigate their risks of selecting applicants with 
a higher likelihood of failure in implementing grant programs. Thus, for grantors who 
assume that grantees with higher capacity are more likely to succeed in implementing the 
grant programs, administrative capacity—which is reflected by “the professionalism and 
complexity” —is a “heuristic to reduce search costs,” which incentivizes grantors to select 
higher capacity applicants (pp. 1131-1132). 
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2.1.2. Federal politics 
 The political science literature in this area of research has focused on the federal 
politics that pertain to grant allocation. In these studies, the main assumption is that the 
distributive policy is decided by pork barrel politics—politicians try to secure funds for 
their political interests [e.g., political (electoral) support for their districts]. In these studies, 
typical political variables are: Congressional members from each state that serve on 
relevant committees (e.g., Evans, 1994; Lazarus & Steigerwalt, 2009; Young & Sobel, 
2013), average tenure-length of Congressional members from each state (Young & Sobel, 
2013), Senate over-representation (Hauk Jr & Wacziarg, 2007; Larcinese, Rizzo, & Testa, 
2013; Lauderdale, 2008), composition of party affiliation in Congress (Balla, Lawrence, 
Maltzman, & Sigelman, 2002; Levitt & Snyder, 1995), and presidential partisanship or 
support to the president (C. R. Berry, Burden, & Howell, 2010; Young & Sobel, 2013). 
This section introduces examples from the political science research literature. 
  Young and Sobel (2013) examined ARRA funds given to 50 states and the 
determinants that affected ARRA fund allocation from the federal government and the U.S. 
Congress. Using four different groups of independent variables—Keynesian determinants 
of countercyclical policy7, Congressional power and dominance8, Presidential electoral 
7 Keynesian determinants of countercyclical policy are unemployment rate and change, state tax 
revenue growth, level and growth change of real state per-capita GDP, marginal propensity to consume 
in state (MPC). 
8 Political variables include federal grants and payments to state & local governmnts (FEDAID), 
FEDAID/federal revenue, average tenure-length of state’s representatives and senators, number of state 
prepresentatives sitting on the appropriations committee in the House and Senate, and Democrats (or 
Republicans) on the appropriations committee. The authors also added: the funds for four departments 
(Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Education, Department of Transportation, 
and Department of Energy), total members and each party’s members sitting on the House and Senate 
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vote maximization 9 , and demographic variables—the authors tested whether the 
independent variables affected total ARRA spending and the four departments’ funds, 
which were divided into “funds announced and funds made available10.” Analysis of the 
2009 data revealed that federal money received in the previous year was important to 
acquire ARRA funds. Tenure of House members had positive effects on total ARRA fund 
allocation, but Tenure of Senate members had negative effects. States that Barrack Obama 
won in 2008 were likely to receive ARRA funds rather than other states. Moreover, 
Democratic members of committees and subcommittees significantly affected fund 
allocation to their states. Their study provides a comprehensive approach to test ARRA 
fund allocation with multiple dimensions of explanation: economic conditions, presidential 
effects, and congressional effects. 
 Larcinese et al. (2013) studied the effects of population dynamics on the allocation 
of federal budget. Criticizing previous literature that used state size (population) as an 
explanatory variable for variations in federal money allocations, the authors divided the 
appropriations and authorization subcommittees, and total members and each party’s members on the 
authorization subcommittee of the House. 
9 One of the variable groups is the electoral importance measure (Y), measured by Y = 1 − 4 ×(X − 0.5)2, where X means % of a state’s popular vote won by Barrack Obama in 2008. The other one 
is a dummy, with a value of 1 if Obama won the state in 2008. 
10 (1) Funds Announced by an agency means “Funds that have been publicly announced as available 
to entities outside of the federal government. Not all available funds are announced publicly. For 
example, the funds going to a project started prior to the Recovery Act that are commingled with the 
project’s Recovery funds will not be announced publicly before being made available to a recipient). 
The Funds Announced figure should not be viewed as the total funding that an agency has made 
available.” (2) Funds Awarded (Obligated by the federal agency) to a Recipient means “Funds that 
have been made available to a recipient.” (3) Funds Paid Out (Gross Outlay) by an Agency means 
“Funds that a federal agency has paid out to a recipient.” 
http://www.recovery.gov/arra/FAQ/Pages/glossaryHome.aspx 
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population effects into slow- and fast-growing, and stressed that the most important factor 
was speed of growth rather than an absolute size of a state. They used outlays data of federal 
budgets from 1978-2002, and adopted regression models, such as OLS and fixed effects. 
Their independent variables were Senators per capita that implies Senate over-
representation11, State population, and Population index12. Other control variables were 
socio-economic variables 13 . The authors concluded that small population size was 
important in federal budget allocation, but slow population dynamics was more important 
than the size of a state. More specifically, a fast-growing small state was likely to lose 
federal money compared to a slow-growing large state (p. 279). In addition, among six 
categories 14 of dependent variable, Senators per capita had a positive effect on grant 
allocation without the population index variable, but had no significant effect with the 
population index variable that had a negative sign for allocation. 
 Gimpel, Lee, and Thorpe (2012) investigated reasons why the ARRA funds were 
not distributed to economically disadvantaged counties. To explain the reasons, the authors 
adopted two models: Policy Windows and Pork Barrel. From the rationale of the Policy 
Windows model, preexisting policy goals (e.g., energy, health care technology, 
infrastructure and education) were occasionally coupled with issues that the ARRA aimed 
11 Senator per capita is 2/population, and the over-representation index is (2/state population)/(96/US 
population)=US population/48* state population). 
12 Population Index = Each year’s population/ base year (1978)’s population 
13 Socioeconomic variables include income, unemployment, % aged above 65, % within schooling age 
(5-17) 
14 The dependent variable is measured as total federal spending, direct payments to individuals, grants, 
salaries, defense expenditure, and federal spending on except defense. 
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to address (which were triggered by the Great Recession). The funds were allocated to 
pursue those shared goals as long as grantees did not deviate from the aims of the Recovery 
Act. The authors ultimately showed, via the results of their quantitative analysis (OLS) —
which used expenditure data of total ARRA funds and infrastructure spending—that 
variables of the Policy Windows model15 explained much more of the ARRA funds than 
variables of the Pork Barrel model16. 
 Rich (1989) researched determinants of federal grant allocation. After reviewing 
theories of Political-Business Cycles, Pork Barrel Politics, Bureaucratic Politics17, and 
Grantsmanship, he criticized that prior literature oversimplified the determinants as only 
political variables. For example, the Political-Business Cycle model explains that 
governments expand their spending during the period encompassing national elections. He 
said that the model does not sufficiently explain grant allocation, because Congress must 
legislate a grant program’s creation and the modification of rules for grant programs, and 
because the President must also persuade Congress into agreement with his policy change. 
Moreover, the Pork Barrel Politics model explains “the norms of universalism and 
15 Variables for the Policy Window model were National Institutes of Health, National Parks, Number 
of airports, Interstate mileage, U.S. highway mileage, Water area, Number of PhDs granted by local 
universities, % Employed in computing and science, % Employed in health and social services, and % 
Employed in state and local government 
16  Variables for the Pork Barrel model were Counties represented by a committee of House 
Transportation member, Appropriations, and Energy and Commerce member; Counties represented by 
a committee of Senate Environment and Public Works and Appropriations member; Total members of 
House serving county; % Democratic House members serving county; % Democratic senators serving 
county; and % Democratic presidential vote 2008 
17  “Bureaucrats allocate expenditures both in gratitude for past support and in hopes of future 
congressional support; and congressmen support agencies both because they owe them for past 
allocations and because they desire future allocations” (Arnold 1979, p. 36 as cited in Rich 1989, p. 
196). 
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reciprocity” with congressmen’s political interests, which induce the allocation of funds to 
programs that impact a broad number of districts. However, according to Rich, the work of 
Congress primarily concerns agreement with “overall program authorization,” except for a 
few programs, and most substantial decision making is conducted by bureaucrats. Thus, he 
argued for a comprehensive approach, encompassing “political influence, community 
needs, and local demand and administrative capacity.” From the regression results, local 
demands, prior experience on a grant program, local needs18, and House members variable 
had positive effects on the amount of federal aid awarded. 
 
2.2. Literature review on Grant Implementation 
2.2.1. Government capacity and policy implementation 
 Various prior studies have emphasized that government (or organizational) 
capacity (GC) plays an essential role in policy implementation success for recipient 
governments (e.g., Carley et al., 2015; Hou, Moynihan, & Ingraham, 2003; McDermott, 
2006). Fredericksen and London (2000) explained that organizational capacity to 
implement a policy is a fundamental factor in the decision-making of agencies that allocate 
funds to recipients. They also asserted that the success in policy implementation depends 
on the capacity of the grantee or the contractee. McGuire, Rubin, Agranoff, and Richards 
(1994) stated, citing a couple of articles (Mead, 1986; Sokolow, 1989), small communities 
18 Local needs were measured by population change, employment change, per capita income change, 
unemployment, poverty, among others. 
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are “less well off” and lack organizational and managerial capacity, so these communities 
are less likely to have adequate abilities to implement development projects (p. 426). 
Honadle (1981) suggested that the definition of capacity comprises several dimensions19, 
and she indicated that capacity is the ability to “develop programs to implement policy” (p. 
577). Hou et al. (2003) examined management capacity, by adopting their research project, 
the Government Performance Project (GPP). They proposed five management systems— 
“financial management, capital management, human resources management, information 
technology, and managing for results”— and suggested that the five components “act as 
enablers to policy implementation” (p. 297). Collins and Gerber (2006) suggested a 
postulate regarding the relation between capacity and implementation. They stated, 
“…local governments with greater capacity are more likely to implement programs that 
comply with state and federal regulations” (p. 618). McGuinn (2012) insisted that 
insufficient capacity and political constraints would hinder the policy implementation of 
governments (p.147), while Gamkhar and Pickerill (2012) similarly argued that “fiscal and 
institutional capacity constraints at the state and local levels have become real obstacles to 
sustaining meaningful reform.” 
 In an investigation of education policy, McDermott (2006) presented the case 
study of Massachusetts education reform and stressed the importance of government 
capacity. Aside from the other two factors for success (i.e., incentive structure and trust) in 
the implementation of education reform, lack of government capacity is the critical point 
19 The dimensions include the ability: to anticipate and influence change; make informed, intelligent 
decisions about policy; develop programs to implement policy; attract and absorb resources; manage 
resources; and evaluate current activities to guide future actions. 
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that can hinder policy implementation. For example, McDermott asserted that “insufficient 
administrative capacity hindered use of sanctions and also limited the state Department of 
Education’s ability to provide assistance for underperforming schools and districts” (p.51). 
The necessary condition for government capacity encompasses human and financial 
resources, even though governments do not have fully sufficient resorces (p. 54). 
 
2.2.2. Government capacity and ARRA implementation 
 Researchers have examined the effect of GC on the implementation of the ARRA 
program. Carley et al. (2015) examined whether or not federal guidance and state capacity 
affect a state’s speedy spending of ARRA energy funds. They set the dependent variable as 
the percentage of actual expenditures of obligated ARRA energy funds—in which a higher 
percentage indicates that a state spent the energy funds rapidly (or efficiently) to meet an 
objective of the Recovery Act. Using a fractional logit model, the authors found that 
government capacity20 and guidance were positively associated with spending of ARRA 
funds.   
 Terman and Feiock (2014) investigated factors affecting outcomes that were 
measured by the delay of implementation. Using their own survey data on the Energy 
Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant (EECBG) Program, the authors tested the 
involvement of the city council and the mayor and government capacity, with other control 
20 It is measured with “some combination of relevant technical skills, the existence and leveraging of 
relevant organizational experiences, adequate resources, the cognitive skills necessary to learn and 
adapt, and human capital or adequate personnel resources” (p. 116).  
23 
                                                 
variables. Among the five variables, only the lack of staff capacity was statistically 
significant and negatively affected the implementation delay. The authors interpreted that 
negative effects were produced because governments “self-select into project types where 
less staff capacity is necessary” (p. 18). Terman and Feiock (2015) studied municipalities’ 
perception of the ARRA program (EECBG) time rules, which require recipient 
governments to implement ARRA projects in a timely manner. Though their key 
independent variables were the use of third-party implementers (e.g., contractors), the 
authors employed government capacities as control variables (i.e., administrative capacity, 
policy capacity, and management structure). The results of their ordered logit regression 
indicated that policy capacity had negative effects, which means a higher capacity 
government is less likely to suffer from the time rule. However, the management structure 
variable had positive effects, which implies a council-manager form of government would 
be in a disadvantaged position to overcome the time rule.  
 Table 2 provides the summary of studies that I reviewed above. It shows the 
measurement of GC, dependent variables, research method, data, and effects of GC on 
dependent variables.  
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Table 2 Literature of ARRA fund and government capacity 
Studies Capacity Dependent Var. Method Effects 
     
Carley et 
al. (2015) 
Government 
relevant 
experience, 
financial 
management 
capacity 
ARRA energy fund 
spending 
Fractional 
logit, 
Generalized 
linear 
+ 
Terman 
and Feiock 
(2015) 
Administrative 
capacity, 
Policy 
capacity, 
Management 
structure 
Energy Efficiency 
and Conservation 
Block Grant 
(EECBG), 
Perception on rules 
of time limits as an 
obstacle 
Ordinal 
logit 
Policy 
capacity (-), 
Management 
structure (+) 
Terman 
and Feiock 
(2014) 
Overall 
capacity, 
Managerial 
capacity, 
Dedicated 
sustainability 
staffing, 
lack of staff 
capacity, 
lack 
information 
resource 
deviation in days of 
delay for project 
from the average 
number of days of 
delay 
Hierarchical 
cross-level 
random 
effects 
model 
Lack of staff 
capacity (-) 
 
2.3. Literature review on Grant Impact and Government Expenditure 
2.3.1. Theoretical background of grant impact 
 Before discussing grant impact, we must first identify how to classify types of 
intergovernmental grants. Figure 2 presents the way of grant typology with four criteria: 
the condition on use, the method of grant allocation, whether or not a grant requires 
matching funds, and the limit of grant size.  
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 Figure 2. Types of intergovernmental grants. Adapted from Fisher (2007, p. 204)   
 
 First, according to the conditions of use, we can distinguish general grants and 
categorical grants. “Federal intergovernmental grants to state government all are 
categorical grants” (Fisher & Bristle, 2012, p. 224); ARRA grants—which are instances of 
states spending federal grant funds—have restrictions on their use. Second, we can 
distinguish between method of allocation: formula and project grants. As described above, 
ARRA includes both methods of allocation. Formula grants were allocated according to 
preset criteria, and project grants were distributed by the competition-based method. Third, 
grants can be categorized as matching or non-matching. If the amount of grant changes 
when a recipient government changes taxes or expenditures, the grant is called a matching 
grant. Otherwise, the grant is referred to as a lump-sum or non-matching grant (R.C. Fisher, 
2007, p. 204). ARRA grants were structured as one-time aid; recipients’ requirement to 
match spending was waived, so these were lump-sum grants. Lastly, matching grants can 
Conditon on use:
Allocation method:
Matching:
Limit on grant size:
Categorical Grants
(use intended for specific activity)
Revenue
sharing
(tax-effort
matters-
variable match)
Close-ended
(grant
amount
limited)
Open-ended
(no limit on
grant
amount)
FormulaProject
Matching
Lump-sum
(no spending
required)
General grants
(no use restrictions)
Formula
Lump-sum
(no spending
required)
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be considered closed-ended or open-ended—depending on whether a limit has been placed 
on the grant amount. 
 Let us now examine grant impact. Economic theories have suggested that 
“matching grants are more stimulative than lump-sum grants” (R.C. Fisher, 2007, p. 207). 
This is due to the size of price effect, which is caused by matching grants. The size of price 
effect is greater than the one of income effect that lump-sum grants generate. If ARRA 
grants had been designed to be matching grants, state spending might have been much 
greater than the real effects. However, given the severe and urgent situation produced by 
the Great Recession, a prompt counter-cyclical fiscal policy was needed, so perhaps lump-
sum grants were indeed the most appropriate grant-type for the ARRA program. 
 Figure 3 presents the effect of lump-sum grants that has a specific purpose of 
spending. Let’s assume that a recipient government currently consumes X at 𝑥𝑥0 under 
the initial budget line (AB). If the recipient government receives intergovernmental grants 
(G), it shifts the initial budget line (AB) to ACD21. Albeit granters expect recipients would 
increase their spending on X as much as the amount of grant, there is a possibility that the 
recipient decides to consume a lower level of X at 𝑥𝑥1.22 This is called fungibility which 
means a recipient diverts the funds that would have been spent on a specific purpose to 
another purpose in the overall budget, because the recipient saves the substantial amount 
of the fund after being subsidized by the grant. That is, if fungibility happens, a recipient 
21 If the grant does not have the restriction, the second budget line should be FD. 
22 𝑥𝑥0 𝑥𝑥1  is smaller than G 
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government increases the total amount of spending by less than the amount of grant that 
grantors expected. The categorical lump-sum grant “does not guarantee that expenditures 
on the aided category will increase by the full amount of the grant” (Fisher, 2007, p. 211). 
 
 
Figure 3. Impact of lump-sum grant 
 
 The issue of fungibility represents much to the impact ARRA grants had on state 
government expenditures since the Great Recession. Some studies have suggested that 
federal aid has crowding-out effects (i.e., federal aid triggers declines in state spending). 
For example, Knight (2002) asserted that grant awards had negative effects on state 
spending—based on his two-stage least squares model analyzing the federal highway 
grants. However, most studies assert a positive relationship between federal grants and 
subnational government expenditure. The positive relationship is supported by the flypaper 
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effect. A lump-sum grant is known that its effect on increases in expenditure is greater than 
income’s effect, which is called the flypaper effect (Fisher, 2007, p. 218). According to the 
economics of public finance, federal grants shift the budget line to the right, and, 
consequently, the government would spend a greater quantity of money. For instance, 
concerning the flypaper effect, Nesbit and Kreft (2009) analyzed the effect of a $1 increase 
in the federal grant on state highway spending. After reviewing previous literature that 
showed the positive effects on state expenditure, the authors presented results of their 
analysis—indicating similar effects. This refutes the argument that federal grants have 
crowding-out effects and indicates that flypaper effects are being produced.  
 The purpose of a federal grant is not to “supplant” subnational government 
spending but to “supplement” it (CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, 2011). So, 
many federal grants are accompanied by a maintenance-of-effort (MOE) provision to 
induce subnational governments to spend their own money on the grant program, thereby 
preventing them from spending their money on their priorities. However, the degree of 
impact on government spending increase is not clear (CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET 
OFFICE, 2011), and one study suggested that federal grants have a crowding-out effect on 
state government spending. Thus, the present dissertation examines if ARRA grants had 
stimulative effects on state government expenditures, and if so, determines the degree of 
these grant effects.   
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2.3.2. Determinants of government expenditure  
 This section presents a literature review on determinants of recipient government 
expenditures—to find implication that can be applied in the examination of grant impact 
on expenditure. Factors affecting government expenditure are categorized into political, 
fiscal (institutional), and external factors of government. First, in terms of political 
determinants of expenditures, the literature generally states that the Republicans are more 
likely to have a balanced budget (Hou & Smith, 2010), whereas Democrats tend to have 
higher demands on spending (Alt & Lowry, 1994). Second, another determinant, legal 
limitations [e.g., tax and expenditure limitation (TELs)], hinder governments from raising 
taxes (revenues) or expenditures (Amiel, Deller, & Stallmann, 2009; Deller, Stallmann, & 
Amiel, 2012; Mullins & Wallin, 2004). Third, external factors affect government 
expenditure: median income from the median voter theorem (Congleton & Bennett, 1995; 
Mueller, 2003, p. 244) and the unemployment rate from the business cycle hypothesis (e.g., 
Hou & Smith, 2010; McGranahan, 1999). 
 
Political factors for expenditures 
 Though the administrative body participates in policy formulation, the main actors 
of policy decision-making process are politicians in the representative democracy system. 
Due to the properties of budgeting that reflect government policies, political factors are 
essential to analyze public finance and budget issues. In addition, political variables are 
needed to analyze infrastructure finance, because infrastructure investments extend across 
long time periods, compared to the short time periods of politicians’ terms, which may 
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cause politicians to transfer current fiscal responsibility to future generations (W. Wang, 
Hou, & Duncome, 2007, p. 26). Thus, the first determinants of government expenditure are 
political factors.  
 It is generally known that Democrats are high-demand parties on spending, 
compared to Republicans. However, there is not enough evidence to support this anecdote. 
Poterba (1995b) suggested that state legislatures with a Republican controlled lower-house 
and a Democratic controlled upper-house (i.e., State Senate) tended to have above-average 
spending; however, states with the reverse political party configuration in their legislature 
tended to have below-average spending. While redistributive expenditures are 
differentially affected by the respective ideologies of the U.S. political parties, it remains 
unclear if developmental spending is affected by these different ideologies. Thus, we must 
examine the effect of political differences on transportation investments as the 
developmental policy. 
 
Fiscal institutions for expenditure 
 Concerning the impact of fiscal institutions, tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) 
and balanced budget requirements (BBRs) have been mainly discussed in the research 
literature. Most states place legal limitations on governments that hinder them from raising 
taxes (revenues) or expenditures (Amiel et al., 2009; Deller et al., 2012; Mullins & Wallin, 
2004). In one study, Hou and Smith (2010) reported that expenditure limitation rules had a 
positive relation with fund balance, but tax limitation had a negative association with fund 
balance. Amiel et al. (2009) constructed a stringency index of TELs with 28 weighted 
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criteria. They proposed six groups of 28 criteria23 (p. 6). Higher aggregated value of the 
components indicates higher level of stringency of TELs. In the present study, I adopt the 
stringent index of TELs as a fiscal institution variable in the quantitative analysis. 
 The second fiscal institution is the balanced budget requirement (hereafter BBR). 
BBRs do not directly affect transportation expenditure. BBRs “usually apply to operating 
budgets and not capital or pension funds. Within current expenditure, they cover general 
funds and not federal funds or special funds dedicated to specific purpose such as local 
governments or transportation. As a result, BBRs typically apply to less than 75 percent of 
state budgets” (Gordon, 2012, p. 249). However, BBRs could affect transportation 
expenditure indirectly, because transportation expenditures are allocated partially from 
general funds, and budget allocations for other categories would also affect transportation. 
 BBRs exist in three different forms (NCSL, 2010, p. 2): (1) the budget proposal 
should be submitted with a balanced budget; (2) the “enacted budget” also should be 
balanced; and (3) deficit carryover is not allowed. Though most states have rules pertaining 
to BBRs, specific requirements and their stringency differ across states (Mahdavi & 
Westerlund, 2011; NCSL, 2010; Poterba, 1995a). Early studies used one component of the 
23 [A] – [F] indicates the five groups of 28 criteria, and the numbers in parentheses means a weighting 
of each criterion. [A] Restriction on Revenue and expenditure (6), Revenue (5), Expenditure (4), 
Appropriations (3), Tax revenue (2), General fund expenditure (1); [B] Statutory (0) or constitutional 
(1); [C] Growth restriction: Less than or equal to inflation and/or population growth (7), Less than or 
equal to the rate of personal income (6), Limited to growth in the state economy (5), Less than 7% of 
state income (4), Greater than 7% of state income (3), Equal to a share of total revenue or expenditures 
(2), New or increased taxes and fees (1); [D] Method of approval: Constitutional convention (4), 
Legislative referendum (3), Citizen initiative (2), Legislative vote (1); [E] Override provisions: No 
override allowed (4), Voter approval to raise taxes and expenditure of surplus revenues (3), 
Supermajority vote (2), Declaration of emergency and/or supermajority vote to use emergency funds 
(1); and [F] Exemptions: Budget reserves (-1), Grants (-1), Capital projects (-1), Debt service (-1), 
Court mandates (-1), Non-recurring general fund appropriations (-1) 
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three BBRs or valued each component and aggregated the components. The deficit 
carryover rule that prohibits governments from transferring budget deficits into the next 
fiscal year affects state revenues and expenditures (Alt & Lowry, 1994; Poterba, 1994). 
ACIR (1987) presented the fiscal stringency index that was measured by four components: 
the submission of a balanced budget, the passing of a balanced budget by the legislature, 
three levels of deficit carryover rules, and whether each rule is defined by the constitution 
or by statutory processes. Hou and Smith (2006) developed the BBR index, claiming that 
indices in prior studies were measured in ways that “at least partially reflect personal 
perception, judicial interpretation, and other nonstatutory and nonconstitutional 
considerations” (p. 27). They suggested nine components of BBRs—categorized by type 
of rule (technical and political) and phase of the budget cycle. They utilized the index in 
another study (Hou & Smith, 2010), and found each BBR’s statistically significant effect 
on fund balances. Mahdavi and Westerlund (2011) tested if BBRs are associated with fiscal 
sustainability indicators that were measured as fund balances24. They adopted the BBR 
classification of Hou and Smith (2006) and applied four BBRs from the categorization, 
BBR2, BBR5, BBR7, and BBR9, with the ACIR fiscal stringency indicator’s accumulated 
value. Using bootstrap p-values, they concluded that BBRs are positively related to a fiscal 
sustainability indicator, general revenues less current expenditures.  
 In the present study, I adopt the TELs fiscal stringency index from Amiel et al. 
(2009) and the BBRs rules surveyed by NCSL (2010).  
24 “B1. Total revenues less total expenditures, B2. General revenues less general expenditures, B3. 
General revenues less current expenditures, and B4. Own-source general revenues less current general 
direct expenditures” (Mahdavi & Westerlund, 2011, p. 959) 
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External factors for expenditures: Median voters and Business cycle 
 The median voter theorem and business cycle model are typical public choice 
theories that stress economic theoretical methods to explain public policy decision making. 
First, according to the median voter theorem, median voters are regarded as the decisive 
group that affects decision making for governmental policy in the majority-voting system 
of democracy. The median voter is more decisive in determining “the majority-voting 
equilibrium25” in an inequality society in which mean income exceeds median income, 
compared to an equality society which has similar levels of mean and median income such 
as asymmetric valuation distribution (Hillman, 2009, pp. 415-416). Gramlich and 
Rubinfeld (1982) found that higher-income individuals did not appear to have greater 
preference for public spending than lower income individuals, indicating that the median 
income group more effectively influences public policy than the higher income group. Thus, 
the median voter theorem implies that median income voters are likely to determine the 
demand for public goods rather than mean income people (Mueller, 2003, p. 244). 
Congleton and Bennett (1995) studied whether state highway expenditures were impacted 
by special interest groups and median voters, finding that the latter—a proxy of median 
voters’ preferences—positively affected expenditures per mile, which they used as a 
dependent variable indicating state efforts to maintain and improve roads. However, 
Walden and Eryuruk (2012) yielded different results in an investigation of North Carolina’s 
state highway investments in 100 counties using the median voter model, the special 
25 In a democratic political system by popular sovereignty, a majority-voting equilibrium, “there is not 
majority support in favor of change, particularly in favor of reducing supply” (Hillman, 2009, p. 415). 
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interest group model, the political model, and the combined model. The study distinguished 
the investment into construction expenditures and maintenance spending, and adopted 
lagged value of expenditure to estimate policy lags over time. According to their result, 
median income change was positively significant only for maintenance spending in the 
combined model with a two-year lag, and not significant in other models and for 
construction expenditures.  
 Second, studies on public economics and public finance have adopted the business 
cycle as a driver of expenditures. Because government budget is a subset of the whole 
economy, government expenditure is affected by economic conditions. A proxy for the 
business cycle can be the unemployment rate (e.g., Hou & Smith, 2010; McGranahan, 1999) 
or the deviation values from the mean of gross state product (GSP) growth rate (W. Wang 
et al., 2007). McGranahan (1999) established five types of classified state expenditures: 
“current spending, capital spending, intergovernmental expenditures, interest on the debt, 
and insurance trust expenditures,” and tested whether the business cycle, defined as 
unemployment rate, affects expenditures. The findings indicate that capital is negatively 
affected by the unemployment rate—additional decrease in the unemployment rate caused 
capital expenditures to decrease by $6.93. Following Hou and Smith (2010) and 
McGranahan (1999), the present study uses the unemployment rate as the business cycle 
indicator. 
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2.4. Gaps in literature 
 Chapter II reviewed three strands of literature. Admittedly, previous theoretical 
and empirical studies contributed to expanding current knowledge of government capacity 
and its influence on the public administration of subnational governments. However, gaps 
in the research literature remain. The present study indicates several shortcomings in past 
research, in terms of the (a) theoretical backgrounds used to explain the impact of 
government capacity on governmental performance and (b) conceptualization and 
measurement of government capacity. 
 Previous studies have mentioned government capacity (GC) and suggested that 
GC is involved in grant allocation and grant (or policy) implementation (Krause, Feiock, 
& Hawkins, 2016; Manna & Ryan, 2011; Nicholson-Crotty & Nicholson-Crotty, 2015; 
Terman & Feiock, 2015). However, these studies did not adduce an organized theoretical 
framework for the link between GC and performance. For example, Manna and Ryan (2011) 
did not provide any theoretical background in their explanation of the association between 
GC and grant competition; they merely cited results from some empirical studies. 
Moreover, Krause et al. (2016) and Terman and Feiock (2015) utilized GC as an 
independent variable affecting policy implementation, but did not establish their own 
theoretical framework accounting for the relation.  
 Most prior studies conceptualized and operationalized GC using authors’ intuition 
or citing another research (e.g., Carley et al., 2015; Manna & Ryan, 2011; Nicholson-Crotty 
& Nicholson-Crotty, 2015; Nicholson-Crotty & Staley, 2012; Terman & Feiock, 2014). 
Those researchers simply assigned meaning to the concept of GC based on their practical 
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experience and intuition. For instance, Carley et al. (2015) suggested the definition of 
capacity as “relevant policy experience” and “implementation capacity,” and measured it 
using “the existence and character of renewable portfolio standards (RPS) policy” and “the 
financial management capacity measure developed by the Government Performance 
Project (GPP),” respectively. However, they did not provide any theory supporting the 
measurement. Collins and Gerber (2006), which is cited often in the research literature, 
adopted the number of government employees per resident as a proxy for GC, but also did 
not provide a theory to support the operationalization. 
 Referring to the pros and cons of prior literature, this dissertation proposes 
theoretical backgrounds, then establishes the theoretical framework, in the next chapter. In 
the present study, the three stages of ARRA grants (acquisition, implementation, and 
impact) are regarded as performance of GC. Thus, the theoretical approach of the 
dissertation begins with general theories pertaining to the achievement of goals, and then 
proposes more specific frameworks for the link between GC and performance and for the 
measurement of GC.    
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Chapter III. THEORY DEVELOPMENT  
Chapter III describes the theoretical framework for the link between government capacity 
(GC) and American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) grants, and 
describes the concept of GC. The chapter introduces the framework explaining relations 
between GC and ARRA grant acquisition, implementation, and expenditure recovery. The 
chapter also reviews theories pertaining to GC and presents the concept and measurement 
of GC.  
 
3.1. Theoretical framework  
 This section proposes the theoretical framework of the present study. I begin by 
presenting two background theories: Systems Theory and Resource Based Theory (RBT). 
Systems theory provides the background logic that is utilized to explain how government 
capacity (GC) affects ARRA grants. RBT concerns how GC can be measured and why GC 
is significant for ARRA grants. 
 
3.1.1. Brief review of Systems theory 
 Systems theory is “an approach to organizations that focuses on how they translate 
inputs into outputs” (Kettl, 2011). Historically, system thinking existed before in the form 
of a theory to explain organizations. However, subsequent to the research of von 
Bertalanffy, scholars have utilized General Systems Theory (GST), which can be applied 
to all general science fields (T.-W. Wang, 2004, p. 394) 
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 Systems theory is divided into two approaches: closed system and open system. 
The former views an organization as a machine that is not affected by environment. This 
approach focuses on “the internal workings of the system” (Kettl, 2011). So, it referred to 
as mechanistic or nonliving systems approach. The open system approach assumes that an 
organization is open to the environment. As organic or living systems, organizations react 
to the impact of the environment and interact with each other.  
 However, the modern organization theory is more in tune with the open systems 
theory (Kettl, 2011; Miller, 1965; Sitkin, Sutcliffe, & Schroeder, 1994; T.-W. Wang, 2004). 
As an open system organization, a government: receives “inputs of resources” (e.g., 
equipment and the energies or labor of employees), conducts transformational processes in 
the throughputs phase, and then produces outputs (public services). Even after outputs, the 
open-system functions as a feedback loop, which is a learning process for a government 
(organization) to reflect a positive or negative experience to the new recurring process. 
(Kettl, 2011). By cycling through the phases of the system, a government becomes a more 
effective and efficient organization.  
 For any organization, the most important thing is self-preservation. To do so, 
systems theory focuses on the purpose of government (organization) and seeks the best 
way to achieve that purpose—via the process of translating inputs into outputs. Two 
abilities are critical to an organization’s successful processes and viability: (1) “capacity to 
manipulate or adapt to its external environment” and (2) “capacity to suppress or moderate 
internal threats” (Kettl, 2011, pp. 102-104). That is, the systems theory implies that as an 
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open-system, a government (organization) must continue to enhance its capacity, monitor 
environmental changes, and adapt to make the best use of the changes. 
 
3.1.2. Resource Based Theory 
 Government capacity (GC) is closely related to resources. Resources significantly 
affect strategies to build capacity; resources are a characteristic of higher capacity 
organizations. Public administration researchers have acknowledged the emerging 
importance of resources by citing Resource Based Theory in recent studies (Bryson, 
Ackermann, & Eden, 2007; Lee & Whitford, 2012). 
 Resource Based Theory (RBT) or Resource Based View (RBV) emerged when 
Wernerfelt (1984) proposed the concept, which contends that a firm’s performance is 
dependent on its resources. Before the RBT, the dominant paradigm in industrial 
organization economics was the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm, which 
contends that performance is impacted by a firm’s market power in the industry structure 
(J. B. Barney & Clark, 2007). According to RBT, organizations that outperform others have 
a different portfolio of idiosyncratic resources (J. B. Barney & Clark, 2007; J. B. Barney, 
Ketchen, & Wright, 2011; Lee & Whitford, 2012). RBT had been previously discussed 
mainly in the areas of business administration and economics; however, several scholars 
in public administration have accepted and utilized the theory (Dawes, Cresswell, & Pardo, 
2009; Graddy & Chen, 2006; Haughton, 1999; Lee & Whitford, 2012; Pitts, 2005; Yang, 
Hsieh, & Li, 2009). In the present study, instead of performing an in-depth investigation 
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into the theory itself, I explore characteristics of RBT and apply them to frame the concept 
of government capacity.  
 Recognizing that resources are essential to the performance of a firm (or 
organization), we must first define the concept of resource. J. B. Barney and Clark (2007) 
proposed four attributes that a firm’s resource should have:  
(a) it must be valuable, in the sense that it exploits opportunities and/or 
neutralize threats in a firm’s environment, (b) it must be rare among a firm’s 
current and potential competition, (c) it must be imperfectly imitable, and (d) it 
must be able to be exploited by a firm’s organizational process (p. 57). 
 Resources can be characterized using the VRIO framework, which stands for 
questions of Value, Rareness, Imitability, and Organization. First, valuable resources are 
assessed by whether or not a firm overcomes external threats and responds to opportunities 
by using the resources. By utilizing SWOT (Strengths, Weakness, Opportunities, and 
Threats) analysis, valuable resources can be examined. Second, resources that are 
accessible to competitors cannot be exploited to outperform such competitors; when 
resources are controlled by a small number of firms, these resources can be used for 
survival and to be competitive. Third, if a resource is difficult to imitate (i.e., imperfectly 
imitable), a firm has a competitive advantage over others, which requires one or all of 
historical uniqueness, causal ambiguity, and social complexity.26 Lastly, even if the three 
26 “Firm resources can be imperfectly imitable (or costly to imitate) for one or a combination of three 
reasons: (a) the ability of a firm to obtain a resource is dependent on unique historical conditions, (b) 
the link between the resources possessed by a firm and a firm’s sustained competitive advantage is 
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abovementioned conditions are satisfied, a firm should be sufficiently organized to support 
the resources that have the three attributes (Barney & Clark, 2007, pp. 57-70). 
 We will now review examples of resources. The public administration literature 
(Bryson et al., 2007; Lee & Whitford, 2012) views the concept of resources as a broad term 
that refers to the various types of assets that an administration body can exploit to achieve 
performance and organizational goals. In support of this perspective, J. Barney (1991) 
stated, “resources include all assets, capabilities, organizational processes, firm attributes, 
information, knowledge, etc. controlled by a firm that enable the firm to conceive of and 
implement strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness” (p. 101). In addition, 
intangible and tangible assets are regarded as resources—provided that the assets are 
utilized “to develop and implement strategies” (Ray, Barney, & Muhanna, 2004, p. 24). In 
an empirical study that accounted for RBT, Lee and Whitford (2012) proposed six 
organizational resources that predicted performance: “administrative (structural) resources, 
human resources, financial resources, physical resources, political resources, and 
reputation resources” (p. 690). They operationalized: administrative (structural) resources 
as the number of members in the top governing structure (Senior Executive Service); 
human resources as the level of professionalization of its employees; financial resources as 
spending authority from offsetting collections; and political resources as presidential 
attention and the agency’s public reputation. These factors positively affect organizational 
performance, which implies that RBT is meaningful in predicting performance.  
causally ambiguous, or (c) the resource generating a firm’s advantage is socially complex” (Barney & 
Clark, 2007). 
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 3.1.3. Frame for government capacity and ARRA grant 
 Borrowing from Systems Theory and Resource Based Theory (RBT), the present 
study establishes a theoretical framework that links government capacity and ARRA grants. 
First, the implication of Systems theory is that output is a result of the process of input and 
throughput. That is, the performance (output) of government depends on how well the 
phases of input and throughput performed. In addition, because government is an open-
system organization, the adaptability and manipulability of the external environment are 
also significant; the input and throughput phases must secure abilities (capacities). Second, 
RBT implies that good resources are the key factors for a government to outperform other 
governments. RBT also provides a background to identify the factors that are considered 
to be components of GC. An empirical study (Lee & Whitford, 2012) supported the 
rationale of RBT by considering several resources to be components of capacity (e.g., 
administrative, human, and financial resources).  
 Building on Systems Theory and RBT, the present study proposes a framework for 
the relationship between GC and ARRA grants. Figure 4 presents an open-system, in which 
output (grant acquisition, grant implementation, and grant impact) depends on 
input/throughput (state needs, government capacity, state politics, fiscal institution, 
legislative control, and federal politics). According to the type of output, the set of input 
and throughput differs. For example, the framework assumes federal politics affect only 
grant acquisition, whereas state needs affect all outputs. 
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 Among the factors of input and throughput, government can only control or 
manage government capacity. Thus, the present study focuses on government capacity as 
the key independent variable that affects all grant outputs.   
 
 
Figure 4 Schematic Model 
 
3.2. Conceptualization and measurement of Government Capacity 
 This section reviews theory development for the concept of government capacity 
(GC) and suggests a measurement of GC. I present a review of previous literature on this 
topic, and review the concept of GC and examples of how to measure management capacity 
and financial capacity. Then, I describe the concept and framework of GC used in the 
present study and propose an operationalization of GC for the empirical analysis of ARRA 
grants.  
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3.2.1. Literature review of Government Capacity (Capability)  
 Public administration scholars have examined the concept of GC; however, no 
consensus has been reached on how to define or measure it. The present study explores the 
concept and the measurement of GC and endeavors to find alternative uses for it. The 
concept of capacity, in the context of different research studies, is reviewed to compare 
how the various studies defined and utilized capacity. Then, I introduce empirical studies  
on GC that investigate management capacity and fiscal capacity. 
 
Concept of government capacity in literature 
 The dictionary definition27 of capacity is “the ability or power to do, experience, 
or understand something,” “the maximum amount that something can contain,” or “amount 
that something can produce.” A related term, capability, is defined in the dictionary28 as 
“power or ability,” “the extent of someone’s or something’s ability,” or “forces or resources 
giving a country or state the ability to undertake a particular kind of military action.” The 
common ground between the dictionary definitions of capacity and capability is “ability.” 
While capability focuses on “ability” or “resources,” capacity additionally encompasses 
the meaning of volume to contain something. With respect to “ability,” the two concepts 
have the same dictionary meaning. Academic studies rarely distinguish between the two 
terms. Most studies in the field of public administration or political science, account for 
27 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/american_english/capacity 
28 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/american_english/capability 
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capacity and capability as the power or the ability of government, and regard them as 
having interchangeable meanings (Bowman & Kearney, 1988, p. 341).  
 The first mention and conceptualization of government capacity (GC) occurred in 
several pioneering studies (e.g., Bowman & Kearney, 1988; Donahue et al., 2000; Gargan, 
1981; Honadle, 1981). Honadle (1981, p.577) defined capacity as "the ability to anticipate 
and influence change; make informed, intelligent decisions about policy; develop programs 
to implement policy; attract and absorb resources; manage resources; and evaluate current 
activities to guide future actions." Ingraham and Donahue (2000, p. 294) stated that 
management capacity indicates “government’s intrinsic ability to marshal, develop, direct, 
and control its human, physical, and information capital to support the discharge of its 
policy directions.” Similarly, Donahue et al. (2000, p. 384) described management capacity 
as a “government's ability to develop, direct, and control its resources to support the 
discharge of its policy and program responsibilities.” The World Bank (1997, p. 77) refers 
to state capability as “the ability of the state to undertake collective actions at least cost to 
society. This notion of capability encompasses the administrative or technical capacity of 
state officials and of supporting systems and processes, but is much broader than that. It 
also includes the deeper institutional mechanisms that give politicians and civil servants 
the flexibility, rules and restraints to enable them to act in the collective interest.” Although 
Bowman and Kearney (1988, p. 343) did not directly delineate the concept of capacity, 
their study highlighted the abilities of responsiveness, efficient and effective decision 
making, and conflict management. They argued that management capacity would be 
strengthened by developing “program, policy, and resource management skills for 
utilization in federally funded endeavors” (p. 342). 
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 Second movers adopted the early studies’ conceptualization of capacity and 
expanded or applied it according to their research focuses. Van Slyke (2003) explained 
public-management capacity as “personnel, oversight and program audit capabilities, and 
the necessary communication and political skills” (p. 296). Specifically, for management 
capacity, personnel must possess “contract-management experience, policy expertise, 
negotiation, bargaining, and mediation skills” (p. 296). Meanwhile, Hou et al. (2003) 
classified government capacity as “the administrative capacity approach” and “the 
governance capability approach.” The former refers to aspects of the administration that 
considers “the importance of policies, procedures, and resources governing administrative 
action” (p. 300). The latter approach encompasses external aspects of the administration 
(e.g., political influences); the authors regarded capability as the rules or equilibrium that 
are created and restricted by political choice, an institution, and the rule of law—adopting 
the perspective of New Institutional Economics (NIE). Topinka (2011) explained that the 
meaning of capacity is simply “power” and that management capacity can be described 
using the traditional view of administrative management: POSDCoRB (Planning, 
Organizing, Staffing, Directing, Coordinating, Reporting and Budgeting). He accepted the 
model of GPP (Government Performance Project) and explained that the model integrates 
the seven management criteria of POSDCoRB. Selden and Sowa (2004) viewed 
“management capacity as the degree to which the necessary systems and processes are in 
place to maintain an organization” (p. 404). Table 3 summarizes GC concepts that prior 
studies defined.  
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Table 3 Concept of Capacity 
Authors Concept of Government Capacity 
Honadle's (1981) "the ability to anticipate and influence change; make informed, 
intelligent decisions about policy; develop programs to implement 
policy; attract and absorb resources; manage resources; and 
evaluate current activities to guide future actions."  
Ingraham and 
Donahue (2000) 
 
Management Capacity is “government’s intrinsic ability to 
marshal, develop, direct, and control its human, physical, and 
information capital to support the discharge of its policy 
directions.” 
World Bank (1997) “the ability of the state to undertake collective actions at least cost 
to society. 
Bowman & Kearney 
(1988) 
Capability of state government means “(1) to respond effectively 
to change; (2) to make decisions efficiently, effectively (i.e., 
rationally) and responsively; and (3) to manage conflict.” 
Van Slyke (2003) public-management capacity as “personnel, oversight and 
program audit capabilities, and the necessary communication and 
political skills” 
Hou, Moynihan, and 
Ingraham (2003) 
“the importance of policies, procedures, and resources governing 
administrative action” 
Topinka (2011) “power” 
Selden and Sowa 
(2004) 
“the degree to which the necessary systems and processes are in 
place to maintain an organization” 
 
Management Capacity: measurement in empirical studies 
 Most empirical studies have not developed their own concept of “capacity.” The 
research literature asserts that the concept of government capacity “does not exist on its 
own” but rather exists “in relation to its application” (Terman & Feiock, 2014, p. 6). Thus, 
many studies have presented their measurement methods without a thorough discussion on 
the definition of government capacity. Carley et al. (2015) explained capacity in terms of 
relevant technical skills, relevant organizational experiences, adequate resources, cognitive 
skills, and human capital (p. 116). They measured government capacity with two variables: 
policy experience and financial management. Policy experience was measured by the 
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number of years that a state’s renewable portfolio standards was determined for electricity 
policy; they employed “financial management scores” of the Government Performance 
Project (GPP) to measure financial management. To measure the concept of administrative 
capacity, Terman and Feiock (2014) used five components: overall capacity, managerial 
capacity, dedicated sustainability staffing, lack of staff capacity, and lack of information 
resources.29 Terman and Feiock (2015) (a) measured “administrative capacity” using the 
number of financial management employees; (b) “policy capacity” was quantified as a 
dummy variable in which a city was coded as “1” if the city had at least one member for 
sustainability programs; and (c) “management structure” was coded as “1” if a municipality 
was managed using a council-manager system (p. 333).  To measure capacity, Manna and 
Ryan (2011) used the acquisition of a planning grant from the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation; the study also logged population density. The authors assumed that the grant-
award indicates that a state has greater ability to implement policies, because the state’s 
capacity was boosted by the grant, compared to a state that failed to obtain the grant. In 
addition, population density was utilized due to the assumption that an urban state has 
greater ability to apply for and implement programs—compared to a rural state. Table 4 
29 (1) The overall capacity was measured with “Number of financial management staff members in a 
municipal government per 1000 residents,” and (2) the managerial capacity’s proxy was “Council 
manager form of government with appointed city manager.” The other three components were 
measured by the survey. (3) The dedicated sustainability staffing was measured by “Which scenario 
best describes staffing sustainability activities in your city? (Check the response that best applies; 
choices include no dedicated staffing for sustainability, dedicated staff based in city manager/CEO 
office or equivalent, dedicated staff based in the mayor or city council office, and dedicated staff based 
in one or more departments).” (4) The lack of staff capacity was asked as “[In relation to EECBG 
projects] on a scale from 1 = “not an obstacle” to 5 = “substantial obstacle”; please rate how [lack of 
staff capacity] influences your city’s ability to reduce its overall energy consumption.” (5) The lack of 
information resources was measured by “[In relation to EECBG projects] on a scale from 1 = “not an 
obstacle” to 5 = “substantial obstacle”; please rate how [lack of informational resources] influences 
your city’s ability to reduce its overall energy consumption.” (pp. 12-13) 
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summarizes components of management capacity and measurements that previous 
literature discussed.  
 
Table 4 Definitions and Measurements of Government Capacity 
Studies Components of capacity Measurement 
Carley et al. 
(2015) 
Relevant technical skills, 
relevant organizational 
experiences, adequate 
resources, cognitive skills, 
and human capital 
Government relevant experience (the 
number of years of a state’s 
renewable portfolio standards (RPS) 
for the electricity policy), 
financial management capacity 
(financial management scores of 
GPP) 
Bowman and 
Kearney (1988) 
Responsiveness, efficient 
and effective decision 
making, and conflict 
management 
Factor analysis from 32 variables 
Collins and 
Gerber (2008) 
Ability to compete for and to 
manage grant contracts 
The number 
of financial administrators and other 
government administrators for every 
1,000 county residents 
Jennings, Hall, 
and Zhang 
(2012) 
Human, physical, and 
information capital to 
support the discharge of its 
policy directions (accepting 
the definition of Ingraham 
and Donahue) 
GPP scores of four dimensions 
(human resources, financial 
management, infrastructure, 
information) 
Terman and 
Feiock (2015) 
(1) Administrative capacity, 
(2) Policy capacity, 
(3) Management structure 
(1) The number of financial 
management employees, 
(2) dummy, if the city had a member 
for sustainability programs (1/0), 
(3) Council-manager form 
Terman and 
Feiock (2014) 
(1) Overall capacity, 
(2) Managerial capacity, 
(3) Dedicated sustainability 
staffing, 
(4) lack of staff capacity, 
(5) lack information 
resource 
(1) Number of financial management 
staff members per 1000 residents, 
(2) Council-manager form, 
(3~5) from survey questions 
Manna and Ryan 
(2011) 
Administrative talents and 
resources 
The acquirement of a Gate grant and 
the logged population density 
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Fiscal Capacity: concept and measurement 
 While government capacity mainly concerns management capacity, a subordinate 
concept to GC concerns fiscal policy. It is called fiscal capacity, but is also referred to as 
“tax capacity” because major revenues come from taxes. Most studies have discussed fiscal 
capacity mainly in terms of ability to raise revenue (Akin, 1973; Compson, 2003; Dincecco 
& Prado, 2012; Fox, 1977; Kincaid, 1989; Ladd, 1975; Lucke, 1984). The Advisory 
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR, 1962, p. 3) defined fiscal capacity as 
“the resources which a taxing jurisdiction can tax to raise revenue for public purposes.”  
Because the aspect focuses on how much governments can secure revenue through taxes, 
some scholars prefer the term tax capacity over fiscal capacity (W. D. Berry & Fording, 
1997; Lucke, 1984; Tannenwald & Cowan, 1997). Tax capacity is defined by ACIR as “the 
capability of a governmental entity to finance its public services" (W. D. Berry & Fording, 
1997, p. 158). Table 5 summarizes prior studies regarding the concept of fiscal capacity. 
 
Table 5 Concept of fiscal capacity 
Authors Concept of Fiscal Capacity 
Fox (1977) “the ability of governments to obtain resources for public purposes” 
Lucke (1984) “the ability of a government to raise revenue” 
Compson (2003) “a state's ability to raise revenues from its own sources” 
Dincecco & Prado 
(2012) 
“the ability of states to raise tax revenues” 
Kincaid (1989) “the ability to raise own source revenues to meet expenditure choices” 
Berry & Fording 
(1997) 
state tax capacity is “the amount of revenue the state would collect” 
ACIR (1962) “Fiscal capacity is a quantitative measure intended to reflect the 
resources which a taxing jurisdiction can tax to raise revenue for 
public purposes.” 
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 Three types of measurement methods for fiscal capacity are used by scholars who 
regard the concept as tax capacity. Per capita state personal income—measured by dividing 
personal income by the number of residents—was the first method used to measure fiscal 
capacity (Akin, 1973; Compson, 2003; Fox, 1977; Ladd, 1975; Lucke, 1984). However, 
this approach has an inherent weakness because it cannot account for all of a state’s 
resources. Moreover, some states do not directly collect income tax, and even though states 
rely “primarily on the individual income tax for revenue, states make only limited use of 
that tax” (Lucke, 1984, p. 333). 
 The second method used to measure fiscal capacity concerns the representative tax 
system (RTS)30. In fact, RTS does not directly measure fiscal capacity but does compare 
states by creating a fiscal capacity index. The term “representative” indicates average or 
typical. Construction of the index comprises three steps (Kincaid, 1989, p. 11). First, tax 
capacity is calculated by “adding up the hypothetical yields” from all tax-bases, the 26 
bases across eight categories: (1) total property, (2) general sales and gross receipts, (3) 
personal income, (4) corporation income, (5) selective sales, (6) licenses, (7) severance, 
and (8) estate and gift taxes (pp.10-11). Second, tax capacity is divided by the population 
of each state. Third, the index, for comparative purposes, is calculated by dividing the per 
capita tax capacity by the U.S. average per capita tax capacity. Converting it into a 
percentage, the value of the index is distributed up to one hundred (p.11). The attribute of 
the measurement using “average” enables comparison of a specific policy or a tax across 
30 Similarly, the representative revenue system (RRS) concludes other revenue sources, such as user 
fees, as well as taxes (Kincaid, 1989; Tannenwald & Cowan, 1997). 
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states. However, this characteristic creates a weakness in the index: the method cannot be 
used to compare states across time.  
 The third method used to measure fiscal capacity concerns total taxable resources 
(TTR). The TTR approach was modified at the suggestion of Compson (2003) and is 
currently used by the U.S. Department of Treasury, which reports TTR yearly. According 
to Mikesell (2007), TTR is calculated by (1) gross state product (GSP) (2) less non-taxable 
resources, and (3) income resources that are not counted in GSP. 31  The non-taxable 
resources include “federal indirect business taxes, social insurance contributions, and 
federal civilian enterprise surpluses” (p. 537). The income resources encompass “dividends 
and interest earned from out-of-state, certain transfers from the federal government, net 
realized capital gains, and earnings of residents who live out of state” (p. 537). Compared 
to RTS, TTR has pros and cons as a measurement of fiscal capacity. With TTR, we can 
compare states over long-term periods; it is possible to compare each state’s patterns over 
time and all states across time. However, TTR is less useful than RTS in the comparison of 
a specific tax or a policy in terms of tax capacity (p.537).  
 Related to tax capacity, the term tax effort is defined as “the extent to which it 
utilizes its tax capacity” by ACIR (W. D. Berry & Fording, 1997, p. 158), which refers to 
“how heavily a state utilizes its tax bases” (Kincaid, 1989, p. 11). Tax effort is measured 
31 TTR equals “the unduplicated sum of the income flows produced within a state and income flows 
received by its residents which a state can potentially tax.” (Compson 2003, p.59) 
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by the ratio of tax collections to tax capacity32 (W. D. Berry & Fording, 1997, p. 160; 
Kincaid, 1989). Thus, states can have higher fiscal capacity with lower tax effort, or lower 
fiscal capacity with higher tax effort. For instance, Kincaid (1989) and Mikesell (2007) 
presented an examination in which the relation between state fiscal capacity and state tax 
effort has negative correlations.  
 The other approach to fiscal capacity focuses on the portion of government 
revenue dedicated to spending. When evaluating the fiscal policy of a government, it is 
critical to consider how to secure revenue and how to utilize the revenue.  Following that 
rationale, higher fiscal capacity would indicate a government’s potential ability to procure 
revenue, and higher fiscal capacity helps governments develop public services. Mikesell 
(2007, p. 545) asserted that “states with higher fiscal capacity have greater budgetary 
possibilities than do those with lower capacity.” 
 Hou and Moynihan (2008) used the concept of countercyclical fiscal capacity 
(CCFC) and asserted that fiscal capacity “also includes the ability to allocate financial 
resources to deal with future events (p.141).” CCFC is regarded as “the fiscal [tool] to 
minimize disruption from revenue shocks (p.142).” The authors explained that the 
countercyclical fiscal capacity “depends a great deal on predictable rules that direct and 
frequently constrain the behavior of public officials” (p.141). They measured CCFC by 
using the following rules: budget stabilization fund (BSF) and the general fund balance 
(GFB). According to the authors, fiscal capacity is very important to a government facing 
32 “ACIR then defines a state's tax capacity as the amount of revenue the state would collect if it applied 
this set of national-average tax rates to each of its own tax bases (W. D. Berry & Fording, 1997, p. 
160).” 
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challenges such as economic downturn and revenue shock, because the capacity can help 
a government mitigate the shock and cope with the economic emergency. The authors 
insisted that governments with CCFC (BSF and GFB) would “be better able to have high-
performing public services and prosperous economies even as they deal with recessions 
than governments where such tools are absent” (p.142). 
 Borge (2008) explained the relationship between fiscal capacity and government 
efficiency, asserting that fiscal capacity could lower efficiency. In support of their position, 
they argued that governments with higher fiscal capacity are likely to have “good service 
standards even if they are not fully efficient (p.483).” If so, there may be neither a strict 
check from politicians nor political controversy. Moreover, they argued that higher fiscal 
capacity entails “larger operating surpluses and less fiscal stress,” which does not require 
a hard restriction on budgeting (p. 483). Borge used government revenue as a proxy of 
fiscal capacity.33 
 Y. Wang and Zhao (2014) used the concept of fiscal capacity to explain 
government behavior to Public-Private Partnership (PPP). The authors asserted that 
preference of PPP depends on the financial pressure of a government. So, higher fiscal 
capacity was anticipated to have a negative sign to the PPP preference. Per capita annual 
state revenue was used to account for fiscal capacity.  
33 “Since the local taxes are of the revenue-sharing type, the revenue measure can be interpreted as an 
indicator of fiscal capacity. Differences in fiscal capacity reflect differences in tax bases and the design 
of the grant system.” (Borge, 2008, p. 479) 
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 Zhao and Guo (2010) utilized fiscal capacity to explain higher bond ratings. They 
followed a rationale in which a government with higher fiscal capacity would be “more 
capable of making debt payments on time (p.567)” and have positive impacts on their bond 
rating. However, in their empirical examination, fiscal capacity measured by per capita 
general fund revenue had negative effects on GO bond rating, and the authors presented an 
alternative interpretation of the result—stating per capita general fund revenues “reflect 
not only fiscal capacity but also fiscal burden (p. 574)”.  
 In sum, the research literature on fiscal capacity was reviewed using two aspects: 
securing and utilizing revenue. Because aspects both concern revenue, any method used to 
measure fiscal capacity should choose a proxy that reflects revenue. Another implication 
from the review is that the measurement of fiscal capacity can vary according to the topic 
of research or the purpose. Mikesell (2007) stated, “no single approach to capacity 
measurement will meet all analytical expectations.” Thus, provided that the measurement 
retains inherent attributes of fiscal capacity, the method of measurement can be flexible.   
 
3.2.2. Concept and framework for government capacity 
 Following the previous review of theories on government capacity and Resource 
Based Theory (RBT), I now present two arguments. First, as Honadle (1981) mentioned, 
"it is unlikely that a consensus definition of 'capacity' will ever be reached" (p. 575); it is 
difficult to narrowly define the concept of capacity into a single aspect. Instead, it is 
appropriate to define the concept in relation to its application in a research case. Based on 
the literature review of government capacity, three implications were found: (1) capacity 
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means ability; (2) capacity is related to resources; and (3) capacity reflects systems. Thus, 
the present study comprehensively defines capacity as: the ability of government to make 
its performance by utilizing resources and by managing systems.   
 Second, to measure the defined concept of GC, specified components of GC are 
required. The present study refers to RBT for the appropriate components. RBT implies 
that resources are the key success factors for a government (organization) to achieve goals. 
Which resource is appropriate depends on the process of government policy and the nature 
of the resource. Systems theory divides the policy process into four phases: input, 
throughput, output/outcome, and feedback. Because governments can control resources 
only in the input-throughput phases, resources in these phases have greater importance. 
Moreover, resources can be classified as tangible (e.g., human resources) and intangible 
assets (e.g., reputation and knowledge/skills). Donahue et al. (2000) stated, “capacities are 
key components of the black box of public administration; they comprise a set of 
intervening variables in the equation that relates public production inputs and policy and 
program performance” (p. 382). The present study also assumes that output and outcome 
is determined by a combination of capacities. Tangible resources are given or supplemented 
physically, but intangible capacity is learned in the feedback process from success or failure 
in output and outcome. 
 Figure 5 depicts the framework for the concept of government capacity—based on 
systems theory and resource-based theory. First, in the policy process, governments can 
control their own resources only in the input and throughput phases. So, government 
capacity should be defined and measured by the resources in the phases. Prior studies 
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(Bowman & Kearney, 1988; Honadle, 1981) support the approach, which argues that 
capacity building is considered with “a series of inputs.” Admittedly, resources or inputs 
do not necessarily assure great performance; however, they, as indicators of capacity, are 
good tools for anticipating output and outcome and for comparing states (Bowman 1988, 
p. 343). Second, even in the input/throughput phases, resources are categorized into 
tangible and intangible. In reality, both tangible and intangible resources work together “to 
enable the execution of a particular business [administrative] process” (Ray et al., 2004, p. 
26).  
 
  Policy process (systems theory) 
  Input/Throughput Output/Outcome 
Resources 
(Resource 
based 
theory) 
Tangible Human resource capacity, 
Financial resource capacity 
Grant Acquisition, 
 
Grant Implementation, 
 
Grant impact 
Intangible General management capacity, 
Previous Experience capacity 
Figure 5. Framework for government capacity 
 
 Following the framework of capacity, the present study proposes two groups 
(tangible and intangible) and four components (human resource, financial resource, 
general management, and previous experience) of government capacity. The first tangible 
resource capacity is the ability of human resource (capital), which is fundamental to the 
management and operation of the government. The second tangible resource capacity, 
financial resource capacity, indicates revenue as the ability (fiscal policy) of governments 
to disburse. Intangible resource capacities reflect governments’ ability to perform a policy, 
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which encompass general management capacity and previous experience capacity. The two 
tangible resources are related to the input phase, and intangible resources indicates the 
throughput phase. 
 
3.2.3. Measurement of government capacity in the study 
 In addition to the framework for the concept of government capacity, it is also 
important to set specific measurements of the components of GC. This section proposes 
specific proxies of each component of GC—including references to prior literature.  
 In this regard, empirical studies pertaining to government capacity (GC) have two 
implications. First, most empirical studies are not determined to specify a precise definition 
of government capacity; these studies flexibly apply GC to different measurements. Second, 
the meaning of GC can vary according to each situation and policy area. Thus, the present 
study focuses on finding appropriate components of government capacity regarding the 
measurement of GC of state departments of transportation (DOTs).  
 Most studies on government capacity present human resource (HR) capacity as a 
key component of GC. One aspect of HR capacity is the size of the human resource. The 
present study measures it by the number of DOT employees per 1000 residents, following 
the research literature (Collins & Gerber, 2008; Terman & Feiock, 2015).  
 As an additional aspect of HR capacity, I propose the quality of human resources. 
Admittedly, it is difficult to measure quality of human resource using a quantitative proxy; 
a qualitative study might be more appropriate for this task. However, as the best alternative 
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method to capture the degree of the quality for a quantitative analysis, the present study 
utilizes the level of payroll compared to the level of median income in a state. According 
to the efficiency wage theory34, a higher wage than the opportunity cost of labor induces 
workers to be devoted to their organization and increase productivity or quality. A similar 
rationale is presented by the job-satisfaction theory. Wage is an important factor for job 
satisfaction, and higher salary and satisfaction with salary increase organizational 
performance (Selden & Sowa, 2004). Thus, the relative level of payroll can be considered 
a reasonable variable to use as a proxy of quality of human resource. 
 The present study proposes financial resource capacity as the other tangible 
government capacity. As a barometer of government capacity to perform fiscal policy, 
revenue is the most important. Several studies (e.g., Borge, 2008; Y. Wang & Zhao, 2014; 
Zhao & Guo, 2010) also used government revenue to measure fiscal capacity. Instead of 
the “fiscal capacity” terminology, I employ “financial resource capacity.” The term fiscal 
capacity may confuse readers who are familiar with tax capacity—because fiscal capacity 
represents tax capacity (the size of taxable resources) as well as revenue. So, financial 
resource capacity indicates resources that are used for transportation, which refers to “taxes 
and charges levied on transportation-related activities and used specifically for 
transportation purposes” (Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2014). Thus, financial 
resource capacity is measured by summation of motor fuel taxes, motor vehicle taxes, and 
charges, which is standardized by the number of residents. 
34 “The fundamental feature of these models is the claim that employers elicit productivity or quality 
enhancing behaviors from employees by paying wages above the opportunity cost of labor (Rebitzer, 
1995, p. 107).” 
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 Lastly, the study proposes two intangible resource capacities, which is related to 
the ability of government to perform a policy. As a similar term, there is the concept of 
policy capacity. I introduce several definitions of policy capacity. Painter and Pierre (2004) 
defined policy capacity as the ability “to marshal the necessary resources to make 
intelligent collective choices about and set strategic directions for the allocation of scarce 
resources to public ends” (p.2). Polidano (2000) also defined policy capacity as “the ability 
to take decisions on the basis of a knowledgeable assessment of a comprehensive range of 
information, and through a process which brings together the various agencies of 
government that are involved in the area” (p.809). Howlett (2009) explained, following 
Fellegi (1996), policy capacity “as a loose concept which covers the whole gamut of issues 
associated with the government’s arrangements to review, formulate and implement 
policies within its jurisdiction” (pp. 161-162). These definitions share common ground. 
First, policy capacity requires a comprehensive ability to cover the overall process (“whole 
gamut”). Second, policy capacity has the feature of intangible ability (“intelligent 
collective choices” and “knowledgeable assessment”). Comprehensive intangible ability 
accumulates from repeated learning and experience from the policy process. From the 
concept of policy capacity, the present study proposes two intangible resource capacities: 
general management capacity and previous experience. As comprehensive abilities of 
government to perform transportation policy, they are learned by the repeated experience. 
In terms of ARRA transportation grants, thus, intangible resource capacities are measured 
by infrastructure management scores (measured by GPP) and the amount of previously 
funded federal grants. In Table 6, I summarize GC components and measurement. 
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Table 6 Components and measurement of GC 
Variable Measurement 
Human resource capacity1: 
size of human resource 
Number of DOT employees per 1000 residents 
Human resource capacity2: 
quality of human resource 
Total amount of DOT Payrolls / number of DOT employees 
/ state median income x 100 
Financial resource capacity Transportation revenue (motor fuel taxes, motor vehicle 
taxes, and charges)/ residents 
General management 
capacity 
GPP (government performance project) infrastructure 
scores 
Previous experience Amount of federal grants 
 
 As presented above, the dissertation uses secondary data for measuring GC. The 
measurement with secondary data is not enough to reflect the component of GC. If primary 
data were supplemented, the operationalization would be more persuasive. I tried to make 
good deficiencies for measuring GC, especially HR quality and intangible resources, by 
using survey methods. However, due to the low level of response rate (30%), the survey 
data were not utilized in the dissertation. I disclose the survey questionnaires and responses 
in appendices.  
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Chapter IV. RESEARCH QUESTION, METHOD, AND DATA 
Chapter IV presents research questions, analysis method, and data for analysis—divided 
into three sections, according to the three stages of an ARRA transportation grant: 
acquisition, implementation, and impact. Each section explains the rationales of the three 
research questions and their hypotheses, model specifications, and data with descriptions 
of the variables.  
 
4.1. Grant acquisition: Research Question, Method, and Data 
4.1.1. Research question 
 The first research question is “Why do some states receive more ARRA grants than 
others and to what extent does this depend on government capacity?” There are two main 
types of grants, formula-based grants and competitive (discretionary) grants. As indicated 
by their name, formula grants are allocated by a formula with pre-determined multiple 
criteria (e.g., population). Unlike formula grants, competitive grants are not guaranteed and 
depend on many factors, including the applicant’s ability to outperform the other candidates. 
Each federal grantor establishes its own merit-based criteria for selecting appropriate 
recipients, and subnational applicants do their best to develop and submit competitive 
proposals. However, outcomes of the competitions vary across applicants, and the reason 
for the outcomes are less understood. Focusing on competitive grant distribution, the 
present study examines the distribution of competitive grants in the grant-in-aid cycle 
during the Great Recession in an attempt to provide a better understanding of what makes 
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some states more competitive than others, using the key independent variable: government 
capacity. Thus, my research hypothesis is: Governments with higher capacity will receive 
a greater amount of ARRA competitive grants. 
 
4.1.2. Modeling grant acquisition 
 To test the effects of government capacity on ARRA grant acquisition, I developed 
the analysis model, which explains the dependent variable as a function of government 
capacity, federal politics, and state needs. 
Amount of competitive grants per capita =  f (government capacity, federal politics,state needs) 
 The function is expressed in the mathematical form,  
Grant =  eα+𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖GC+𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖FP+𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖SN+ε . 
 It is transformed by taking the natural log on the both sides of the function, that is,  
ln(Grant) = α + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖GC + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖FP + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖SN + ε, 
where GC is government capacity, FP indicates federal politics, and SN means state needs. 
The form of the function is called a log-linear model, because only the dependent variable 
is expressed in logarithms, whereas regressors are expressed in levels. A log-linear model 
can be used when a dependent variable has all positive values and when residuals of an 
original regression model have a positive skewness. As Figure 6 below shows, if the 
dependent variable (i.e., Grant) is used without taking the natural log, the residuals of the 
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linear-linear model have a positive skewness distribution. However, in the log-linear model 
for predicting effects of explanatory variables on Grant, the distribution of residuals 
appears as a normal distribution. 
 
  
(a) Positive skewness in Origial model (b) Normal distribution in Log-linear 
Model 
Figure 6. Distributions of residuals 
 
4.1.3. Data and variables 
In order to examine whether and how the attainment of federal funds depends on 
state government capacity (GC), the study constructs measurements of government 
capacity (GC) and tests its effect on the amount of federal competitive grants acquired by 
a state. The analysis covers all 50 U.S. states during the Great Recession (December 
2007- June 2009).  
 As seen in Table 7, the dependent variable, ARRA grant, is set as a state 
government’s amount of competitive grant awards, which is operationalized by a state’s 
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sum of competitive grants awarded by the federal department of transportation. The data 
source is Recovery.gov.  
 
Table 7 Dependent variable of research question 1 
Variables Measurement 
Log (amount of competitive grants) Log (sum of DOT competitive grants under ARRA) 
  
 In terms of the relationship between government capacity and federal grants, the 
research literature stresses that government capacity plays an important role in grant 
competition (Collins & Gerber, 2008; Manna & Ryan, 2011). Government capacity is an 
indicator of government ability to thoroughly prepare grant competition in the aspect of 
grantees. Furthermore, GC is a good indicator for grantors to screen out low quality 
governments that may fail to successfully implement the grant program. Thus, the present 
study uses government capacity as an independent variable. As demonstrated in the prior 
chapter and Table 8, GC is categorized into three variable groups: human resource capacity, 
financial resource capacity, and intangible resource capacity. Human resource capacity is 
measured by the size of human resource (the number of government employees) and the 
quality of human resource (payrolls per employee); (2) financial resource capacity is 
demonstrated by transportation revenue; and (3) intangible resource capacity is measured 
by GPP infrastructure scores and the received amount of discretionary grants in 2008.  
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Table 8 Government capacity measurement 
Variable Measurement 
Human resource capacity 1: size of 
human resource 
Number of DOT employees per 1000 residents 
Human resource capacity 2: quality 
of human resource 
Total amount of DOT Payrolls / number of DOT 
employees / state median income x 100 
Financial resource capacity Transportation revenue (motor fuel taxes, motor 
vehicle taxes, and charges)/ residents 
General management capacity GPP (government performance project) 
infrastructure scores 
Previous experience Amount of federal grants 
 
 Although grant competition is initially reviewed by the federal government, the 
final decision or authorization is made by Congress. Thus, federal politics are an important 
factor to explain federal fund allocation—in terms of competition between congressmen to 
secure funds for their home states, according to the pork barrel hypothesis. Referring to the 
research literature (e.g., Evans, 1994; Lazarus & Steigerwalt, 2009; Young & Sobel, 2013), 
as described in Table 9, the present study inputs two indicators of the power of 
congressional representatives from each state: the number of appropriations committee 
members and the number of transportation committee members. 
 
Table 9 Federal politics measurement 
Variable Measurement 
Power of congressional representatives from each state 1 Number of Appropriations 
committee members 
Power of congressional representatives from each state 2 Number of Transportation 
committee members 
 
 One function of a grant is to redistribute wealth (or resources) for equality across 
states. The Recovery Act was also enacted to help economies recover and to support 
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economically disadvantaged regions (Gimpel et al., 2012; Young & Sobel, 2013). Thus, 
following previous research, the present study assumes grants are associated with state 
needs, resulting in three variables: urbanization (population density), economic condition 
(unemployment rate), and median voters (median income), as seen in Table 10.  
Table 10 State needs measurement 
Variable Measurement 
Urbanization Population density/100 
Economic condition Unemployment rate 
Median voters Median income/1000 
 
Data come from multiple sources, including Recovery.gov, USAspending.gov, the 
Book of States, U.S. Census, etc. Detailed information of each variable is described in the 
Table 11 below. All explanatory variables reflect values in 2008.  
 
Table 11 Data source 
Variable Source 
ARRA 
grants 
Log (amount of competitive grants) Recovery.gov 
Government 
Capacity 
(GC) 
Human resource capacity 1: size of human 
resource 
Annual Survey of 
Public Employment & 
Payroll Human resource capacity 2: quality of human 
resource 
Financial resource capacity: transportation 
revenue  
Book of States and 
Census Bureau 
General management capacity: policy 
experience for infrastructure management 
GPP report 2008 
Previous experience: policy experience for grant USAspending.gov 
Federal 
Politics 
Power of Congressmen from each state 1 Congressional 
directory Power of Congressmen from each state 2 
State Needs Urbanization Census Bureau 
Economic condition Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 
Median voters Census Bureau 
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4.2. Grant implementation: Research Question, Method, and Data 
4.2.1. Research question 
 The second research question is “Does government capacity affect the 
implementation of ARRA grants? If so, to what extent?” The primary goal of an ARRA 
grant is to spend funds as soon as possible to stimulate the economy. Though the Great 
Recession ended in FY 2009, state governments had to continue reporting their progress in 
fund implementation activities. According to “the DOT weekly financial and activity 
report,” twenty-nine states did not complete spending the ARRA grants, and nineteen states 
implemented the ARRA grants spending less than 90% of their obligations. So, the rate at 
which recipient governments spent or implemented ARRA grant varied across states.  
 The present study investigates whether the difference in the implementation 
(spending) rate depended on state government capacity. More specifically, I tested whether 
and how much pacing in ARRA grant implementation was affected by government capacity. 
Thus, the research hypothesis for the second research question is Governments with higher 
capacity would implement a greater proportion of obligated ARRA grants than others. 
 
4.2.2. Modeling grant implementation 
 To test the hypothesis, the analytical model explains variation in the 
implementation rate of GC and other control variables. Specifically, the study models 
implementation pace—as affected by government capacity, state politics, state needs, and 
fiscal institution. The basic specification is expressed as: 
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Implementation pace =  f (government capacity, state politics, state needs, fiscal institution) 
The equation is composed under the assumption of linear combination, and the function is 
expressed in the mathematical form,  
Grant implementation rate𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = α + βi𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + γi𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + δi𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + θ𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + ε, 
where GC represents government capacity, SP indicates state politics, SN means state 
needs, FI represents fiscal institutions.  
 
4.2.3. Data and variables 
 The unit of analysis is the Department of Transportation in the 50 U.S. states.35 
The time range of data is 2009 to 2012. ARRA funds were initially designed to be 
completely spent no later than 2011 (Carley et al., 2015, p. 114); however, as described 
above, many states failed to do so by 2011 and were allowed to use the funds until 2013. 
So, the present study tests the model using available data of 2009-2012.  
 The dependent variable is implementation pace, measured by the percentage of a 
state’s outlays in the amount of obligated funds. I set the implementation pace separately 
in formula grants, competitive grants, and total grants (combining the two grants). Data 
were obtained from DOT weekly financial and activity reports in Recovery.gov. Table 12 
presents the detailed information of variables. 
35 In the real analysis, Nebraska was omitted because it does not have partisanship in the legislature.  
70 
                                                 
 Table 12 Dependent variable of research question 2 
Variables Measurement 
Implementation pace of formula grants (formula grants outlays / obligations)x100 
Implementation pace of competitive 
grants (competitive grants outlays / obligations)x100 
Implementation pace of total grants (total grants outlays / obligations)x100 
 
 Following prior studies (e.g., Carley et al., 2015; Hou et al., 2003; McDermott, 
2006)—in which GC was essential to policy implementation and performance—I assert 
that independent variables are components of GC. In terms of ARRA grants, quickly 
spending grant funds is an indicator of success in grant implementation. For speedy 
implementation, governments need sufficient human resources, money, and relevant 
experience. Thus, the present study assumes that higher capacity governments will spend 
grant funds faster than lower capacity governments. The operationalization methods for 
GC are the same as in the first question’s model, as described in Table 13. 
 
Table 13 Government capacity measurement 
Variable Measurement 
Human resource capacity1: size of 
human resource 
Number of DOT employees per 1000 residents 
Human resource capacity2: quality of 
human resource 
Total amount of DOT Payrolls / number of DOT 
employees / state median income x 100 
Financial resource capacity Transportation revenue (motor fuel taxes, motor 
vehicle taxes, and charges)/ residents 
General management capacity GPP (government performance project) 
infrastructure scores 
Previous experience Amount of federal grants 
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 In the scholarly research, determinants of expenditure include: state needs, 
political variables (Alt & Lowry, 1994; Hou & Smith, 2010), and fiscal institution (Amiel 
et al., 2009; Deller et al., 2012; Mullins & Wallin, 2004). Indicators of state needs are the 
same as those in the first research question’s model, as seen in Table 14. Urbanization, 
economic condition, and median voters are assumed to affect government expenditure or 
policies on government spending. 
 
Table 14 State needs measurement 
Variable Measurement 
Urbanization Population density/100 
Economic condition Unemployment rate 
Median voters Median income/1000 
 
 Following prior research, this present study adopts political variables and fiscal 
institutions as explanatory variables for grant implementation, as described in Table 15. 
Political variables include each governor’s political propensity, divided government, and 
party control in the legislature. They are all coded as dummy variables. Governor’s political 
propensity is coded as the political party affiliation of governor; I assigned a value of 1 to 
Republican governors, and zero otherwise. Divided government has a value of 1 if the 
governor’s political party controls both houses in the legislature, and zero otherwise. For 
party control of legislature, I coded a value of 1 when the Republican Party occupies the 
majority in legislature, and zero otherwise.  
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Table 15 State politics measurement 
Variable Measurement 
Governor’s propensity  Republican=1, otherwise=0 
Divided government 1 = governor’s party controls both houses, 0 = otherwise 
Party control of legislature Republican is majority party=1, otherwise= 0 
 
 The study uses tax and expenditure limitation (TEL) and balanced budget 
requirement as proxies for fiscal institutions as described in Table 16. First, data of TELs 
originate from previous research: Amiel et al. (2009). The authors developed the TEL 
stringency index with six categories: “1) the type of TEL; 2) if the TEL is statutory or 
constitutional; 3) growth restrictions; 4) method of TEL approval; 5) override provisions; 
and 6) exemptions” (p.5). Its values were coded as an interval scale, so readers can interpret 
it as State A is more stringent than State B, but cannot interpret it as State A is “many times” 
stricter than State B. Maher and Deller (2012) reported that TELs positively affect fund 
balance, but negatively affect own-source revenue and general fund expenditure. Second, 
generally, the balanced budget requirement (BBR) is also used as a proxy for fiscal 
institution in expenditure studies. However, BBR is not directly applied to capital 
investment or transportation, because it is funded mostly from other funds beyond general 
funds. Nevertheless, BBR is controlled in the analytic models since it influences the entire 
budget allocation and could affect transportation expenditure.  
Table 16 Stringency of Tax and Expenditure Limit and of Balanced Budget Requirements 
Variable Measurement 
Stringency of 
TELs 
Summation of values of TELs: 1) the type of TEL; 2) if the TEL is 
statutory or constitutional; 3) growth restrictions; 4) method of TEL 
approval; 5) override provisions; and 6) exemptions 
Stringency of 
BBRs 
Sum of BBRs (Governor Must Submit Balanced Budget, Legislature Must 
Pass Balanced Budget, and Cannot Carry Over Deficit) 
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 The present study utilizes multiple sources for data collection, including 
Recovery.gov, Annual Survey of Public Employment & Payroll, National Conference of 
State Legislatures, USAspending.gov, the Book of States, U.S. Census, etc. Detailed 
information of each variable is described in Table 17 below. All explanatory variables 
reflect values in 2008-2011.  
 
Table 17 Data source 
Variable Source 
Grant 
Implementation 
Implementation pace of formula and 
competitive grants 
Recovery.gov 
Government 
Capacity (GC) 
 
Human resource capacity1: size of human 
resource 
Annual Survey of 
Public Employment 
& Payroll Human resource capacity2: quality of human 
resource 
Financial resource capacity: transportation 
revenue  
Book of States and 
Census Bureau 
GPP report 2008 General management capacity: policy 
experience for infrastructure management 
Previous experience: policy experience for 
grant 
USAspending.gov 
State Needs Urbanization Census Bureau 
Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 
Economic condition 
Median voters Census Bureau 
State Politics 
 
Governor’s propensity  National Conference 
of State Legislatures Divided government 
Party control of legislature 
Fiscal 
Institution 
TELs Amiel et al. (2009) 
BBRs NCSL (2010) 
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4.3. Grant impact: Research Question, Method, and Data 
4.3.1. Research question 
 The research question in this chapter is “To what extent did ARRA grant aid affect 
the transportation expenditure recovery and state transportation investments?” Due to the 
Great Recession, state governments were confronted with diminished revenue; the severe 
economic downturn included factors ranging from the collapse of the housing market to 
weakened stock markets. According to the State Expenditure Report 2009 by NASBO, 
during FY 2008 and FY 2009, “state revenues decreased nearly 12 percent, or by $78.5 
billion” (NASBO, 2009). Consequently, there were declines in state funds (general funds 
and other state funds) for expenditure. However, neither all funds nor total funds decreased.  
 
  
Figure 7 Total Expenditure trend 
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 As seen in Figure 7, in fact, expenditures from total funds increased, in which 
federal grant (e.g., ARRA) influx sharply increased in FY 2009 and FY 2010 and incited 
states to continue to increase spending. However, the size of increase rate was modest 
compared to the historical average annual increase rate of total state expenditures: 6.2%. 
In FY 2009, total state expenditures increased by 5.4% ($1.56 trillion); in FY 2010, the 
increase rate was 4% ($1.62 trillion); in FY 2011, the total amount climbed to $1.69 trillion, 
4.1% (NASBO, 2010). Thus, in the severe situation caused by the Great Recession—in 
which state funds declined due to economic shock—federal aid sustained states to continue 
spending. 
 
  
Figure 8. Transportation Expenditure trend 
 
 This dissertation focuses on transportation expenditure. As shown in Figure 8 
below, states increased their transportation expenditure by 4.3% in FY 2009 and by 6.5% 
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in FY 2010. The increase of expenditure resulted from the impact of the federal fund influx. 
Thus, the present study investigates the degree to which ARRA grants stimulated states to 
spend funds on transportation since the Great Recession. I also check if government 
capacity affects state expenditure, controlling other determinants on expenditure.  
 
4.3.2. Modeling grant impact 
 To answer the third research question, I developed a research model, setting the 
dependent variable as a function of ARRA grants, government capacity, state needs, and 
state politics, fiscal institution, and legislature control. 
Expenditure Recovery (or Expenditure)   =  f (ARRA grant, government capacity, state needs, state politics,                                       fiscal institution, legislature control) 
 The study assumes that the equation is composed by linear combination, and the 
function is expressed in the mathematical form,  
Y𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = α + βi𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + γi𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + δi𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + θ𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + τ𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + ε, 
where Y is expenditure recovery or expenditure, GC is government capacity, SP indicates 
state politics, SN means state needs, FI represents fiscal institution, and LC is legislature 
control.  
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4.3.3. Data and variables 
 The unit of analysis is the Department of Transportation in the 50 U.S. states.36 
Data analysis covers the time range from 2009 to 2011 to investigate the impact of grants 
after ARRA.  
 Regarding the expenditures of state governments, I adopted two dependent 
variable groups. One variable is the transportation expenditure recovery. To test ARRA 
funds’ effects on recovery of subnational expenditure, the study devises it. Because ARRA 
was initiated in FY 2009, FY 2008 is used as the starting point to calculate the degree of 
expenditure restoration. So, the difference between expenditure in FY 2008 (subtrahend) 
and in each fiscal year 2009-2011 (minuend) is regarded as the amount of expenditure 
restoration. This model will indicate the extent that states increased expenditure since the 
last year (FY 2008) before ARRA. The other dependent variable is transportation 
investment. Aside from impact on expenditure recovery, I test how expenditure is affected 
by explanatory variables during the recovery period 2009-2011.  
 Both expenditure recovery and expenditure are categorized into total 
transportation expenditure, transportation capital outlays, and transportation current 
operation expenditure. The study assumes that capital outlays represent expenditures on 
construction, and current expenditures reflect maintenance expenditure. 37  The 
36 In the real analysis, Nebraska was omitted because it does not have partisanship in the legislature.  
37 According to the definitions of State Government Finances, capital outlay means “direct expenditure 
for contract or force account construction of buildings, grounds, and other improvements, and purchase 
of equipment, land, and existing structures. Includes amounts for additions, replacements, and major 
alterations to fixed works and structures.” Current expenditure means “Current Expenditure. All 
expenditures with the exception of capital outlay. Includes Current Operations, Assistance and 
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categorization of expenditures will be useful to investigate which expenditure was 
effectively affected by the federal aid.  
 State governments must spend funds on construction in accordance with the aims 
of the Recovery Act—investment (reinvestment) in transportation and infrastructure—
albeit maintenance activities are also important. So, it is meaningful to check for different 
patterns across types of expenditure, regarding the effects of explanatory variables. All 
amounts were standardized by population and adjusted to real value in 2012 dollars. The 
specific measurements are presented below in detail (Table 18). 
 
Table 18 Dependent variable of research question 3 
Variables Measurement 
Expenditure recovery 
(total, capital, and 
current) 
Transportation Expenditure in FY 2009, 2010, 2011 – 
Expenditure in FY 2008 
 All expenditures are separately computed with State total 
transportation, transportation capital outlay, transportation 
current expenditure. 
 All expenditures are standardized by 1000 state residents 
Transportation 
investment  
(total, capital, and 
current) 
Transportation Expenditure in FY 2009, 2010, 2011  
 All expenditures are separately computed with State total 
transportation, transportation capital outlay, transportation 
current expenditure. 
 All expenditures are standardized by 1000 state residents 
 
 The explanatory variables are the amount of the two types of grant per capita, as 
well as government capacity, state needs, state politics, fiscal institution, and legislature 
control on DOT. First, I test impact of ARRA grants. The theoretical background for grant 
Subsidies, interest on debt, and Insurance Benefits and Repayments.” Expenditures for repairs, such as 
works and structures, are “classified as current operation expenditure.” 
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effects on expenditures is the flypaper effect—which originates from the literature on 
public finance. The implication of the flypaper effect is that, for increases of expenditure, 
the effects of grants are greater than the effects of income (Fisher, 2007, p. 218). Although 
the flypaper effect initially emerged as an explanation for the effects of lump-sum grants, 
it has also been used for other types of grants. Most research that accounts for the flypaper 
effect suggests that federal grants increase subnational government expenditures (e.g., 
Nesbit & Kreft, 2009). However, some research reports that these grants induce crowding-
out effects on the governments (e.g., Knight, 2002). Therefore, the present study uses 
ARRA grants as an independent variable—and tests how and how much the independent 
variable affects expenditure recovery and investment. To compare impacts of the two grant-
types, I distinguished and entered both discretionary and formula grants in the regression 
models. As described in Table 19, ARRA grants per capita are measured by the outlay of 
grants per capita.   
 
Table 19 Operationalization of grants 
Variables Measurement 
ARRA grants per capita Outlay of competitive and formula grants per capita 
(FY2009-2011) 
 
 Second, referring to previous studies (e.g., Carley et al., 2015; Hou et al., 2003; 
McDermott, 2006) asserting that higher capacity governments are more likely to succeed 
in policy performance, the present study assumes that governments with higher capacity 
would perform better in the utilization of federal grants to invest in construction rather than 
maintenance. In contrast, due to the timeline limits of ARRA grants, lower capacity 
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governments that are less proficient at mid-term planning, and do not have sufficient 
resources, may use the grants mostly in the maintenance function.  
 Third, in terms of legislature control of DOT, push-factors and pull-factors affect 
expenditure size. According to Niskanen’s budget-maximization model, bureaucracies are 
incentivized to expand budgets due to the interests of their organizations. In the Iron 
Triangle model, alliances exist between bureaucracy and committee members of the 
legislature. Moreover, Bureaucratic Politics model also assumes the existence of such 
alliances (e.g., instances where bureaucrats allocate funds for politicians who previously 
supported DOT—as a gratitude) (Rich, 1989). Meanwhile, the legislature may hinder 
bureaucratic spending. Every state has an oversight system in which each committee 
controls and collaborates with DOT not only during the session but also during out-of-
session periods. Thus, the present study advances an index of legislature control using 
survey data from AASHTO (American Association of State Highway and Transportation 
Officials)38, and tests how this index affects DOT expenditure. 
 To estimate the legislature control index, I utilized principal component analysis, 
as seen in Table 20. From the analysis, we can store factor scores and variance values. By 
using the variance values as weighting for each component, we can calculate total value of 
38 AASHTO survey has “interactions b/w DOT & legislature data” part with 13 questions and answers 
in terms of oversight mechanisms over DOT, review authority over DOT rules, and legislative role in 
surplus funds, reallocations, PPPs, and design-build. Examples of the 13 Survey Questions are: On-
going oversight by legislative committee (1/0), Legislature performs program reviews or performance 
audits (1/0), Legislature reviews non-legislative programs or performance audits (1/0), DOT Reporting 
Requirements to the Legislature and/or Legislative Committee (1/0), Legislature requests information 
from the DOT(1/0), Is the DOT authorized to retain surplus funds? (1/0), Is legislative approval 
required to move funds between projects? (1/0)  
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the interaction, which is computed with the summation of product of a weighing and a 
factor score, by each state. 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 = Wm� Fmi50
i=1
 
where i means each state, W is a weighting, m indicates each component, and F means a 
factor score.  
 
Table 20 Operationalization of relation between state DOT and legislature 
Variables Measurement 
Legislature control Factor analysis from 13 questions 
 
 The study collected data from multiple sources, including Recovery.gov, Annual 
Survey of Public Employment & Payroll, National Conference of State Legislatures, 
USAspending.gov, the Book of States, U.S. Census, etc. Detailed information of each 
variable is described in the Table 21 below. All explanatory variables reflect values in 
2008-2010.  
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Table 21 Data source 
Variable Source 
Expenditure 
Recovery 
Expenditure recovery on total transportation, 
transportation capital outlays, transportation 
current operation expenditure 
U.S. Census (State 
Government 
Finances) 
Transportation 
investment 
Expenditure on total transportation, 
transportation capital outlays, transportation 
current operation expenditure 
ARRA grant ARRA competitive and formula grant Recovery.gov 
Government 
Capacity (GC) 
 
Human resource capacity1: size of human 
resource 
Annual Survey of 
Public Employment 
& Payroll Human resource capacity2: quality of human 
resource 
Financial resource capacity: transportation 
revenue  
Book of States and 
Census Bureau 
GPP report 2008 General management capacity: policy 
experience for infrastructure management 
Previous experience: policy experience for 
grant 
USAspending.gov 
State Needs Urbanization Census Bureau 
Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 
Economic condition 
Median voters Census Bureau 
State Politics 
 
Governor’s propensity  National Conference 
of State Legislatures Divided government 
Party control of legislature 
Fiscal 
Institution 
TELs Amiel et al. (2009) 
BBRs NCSL (2010) 
Legislature 
control 
Index of legislature control  AASHTO survey, 
author’s computation 
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Chapter V. EMPIRICAL RESULT 
Chapter V presents empirical results according to the three research questions on ARRA 
transportation grant acquisition, implementation, and impact. This chapter includes two 
sections: (1) descriptive results of all dependent variables and (2) regression results for 
each analytic model.  
 
5.1. Descriptive results 
 Prior to the presentation of regression results, this section sets forth descriptive 
results dependent variables by each research question. Each table below includes rankings 
in the first column, a list of states ordered by ranking, and values of each variable. In the 
tables, top five and bottom five states were selected for instance of the variables.  
Table 22 Descriptive results of grant acquisition (2011) 
Ranking State per capita ($) State Total($ million) 
1 WA 137.05 CA 3419.94 
2 IL 134.30 IL 1726.87 
3 AK 124.14 WA 935.00 
4 VT 104.74 NY 837.86 
5 CA 90.71 NC 566.18 
46 KS 6.01 WY 14.58 
47 VA 4.16 ND 11.83 
48 GA 3.91 ID 10.95 
49 NH 3.31 NH 4.37 
50 DE 2.65 DE 2.41 
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 Table 22 ranks states in order of the amount of the acquired transportation grants, 
California secured $ 3419.94 million and was ranked first place. Illinois follows as the 
second state that acquired more grants. Meanwhile, Delaware was the lowest state that 
obtained the smallest amount of grant dollars, $ 2.41 million. 
 
Table 23 Descriptive results of grant implementation (2011) 
Ranking  State Competitive (%) State Formula (%) State Total (%) 
1 NE 100 SD 99.26111 UT 99.31421 
2 NH 100 ME 99.11671 SD 99.22146 
3 UT 99.85898 WY 99.11353 WY 98.96432 
4 SD 98.876 UT 99.09926 NH 98.05435 
5 ND 98.25278 MT 98.73051 ND 97.60734 
46 RI 14.2821 GA 73.76883 HI 58.65316 
47 WA 13.54395 NY 72.65414 NC 57.05924 
48 IL 10.73007 FL 71.65395 WA 48.61869 
49 NC 10.30709 VA 65.18724 IL 46.32236 
50 CA 10.21289 HI 55.67302 CA 45.86135 
 
 Regarding the second research question of grant implementation, Table 23 sorts 
states by three variables: competitive grant, formula grant, and total grant. Overall, Utah 
and South Dakoda were ranked in the top five cluster for all grant categories. Whereas 
California, Washington, and North Carolina, which acquired larger grants, were ranked in 
the bottom five group. It infers that there is a negative association between the amount of 
the grant and the implementation rate. 
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 There is a large variation of expenditure recovery across the top and bottom 
clusters, as described in Table 24. For example, North Dakoda and South Dakoda recovered 
the level of transportation capital outlays much better than Kentucky and Florida. As 
explained in connection with Table 23, overall, good performers in grant implementation, 
such as SD and ND, are likely to be good at expenditure recovery.  
 
Table 24 Descriptive results of expenditure recovery (per capita $, 2011) 
Ranking  State Total State Capital State Current 
1 ND 322.1045 ND 217.9644 AK 58.40176 
2 SD 177.8293 SD 175.5382 ND 57.47378 
3 VT 174.8483 VT 166.759 TN 40.66714 
4 OK 124.8836 UT 133.3282 MN 34.16666 
5 ME 123.8625 ME 131.2376 AL 25.17232 
46 GA -86.8751 GA -82.7672 MA -28.9669 
47 HI -104.757 TX -90.4364 NM -50.9843 
48 MD -119.458 AK -109.842 MD -59.3707 
49 FL -130.097 FL -110.874 VA -59.8894 
50 KY -165.45 KY -163.135 WY -77.9645 
 
 Table 25 presents the pattern across three variables, in which bolded states are 
examples to show the pattern. The top five states in total grant acquisition, such as CA, IL, 
WA, NY, and NC, tend to implement grants slowly. It implies that a higher level of grant 
acquisition would increase task complexity regarding grant implementation. Moreover, a 
higher level of implementation performance seems to contribute to a higher level of 
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expenditure recovery. For example, SD, ND, and UT were ranked in the higher position of 
the implementation category, and they were also included in the top five group of 
expenditure recovery.  
 
Table 25 Comparison of states in three stages of ARRA 
Ranking Grant Acquisition Implementation Expenditure recovery 
per capita Total Competitive Formula Total Total Capital Current 
1 WA CA NE SD UT ND ND AK 
2 IL IL NH ME SD SD SD ND 
3 AK WA UT WY WY VT VT TN 
4 VT NY SD UT NH OK UT MN 
5 CA NC ND MT ND ME ME AL 
46 KS WY RI GA HI GA GA MA 
47 VA ND WA NY NC HI TX NM 
48 GA ID IL FL WA MD AK MD 
49 NH NH NC VA IL FL FL VA 
50 DE DE CA HI CA KY KY WY 
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5.2. Regression results 
 This section includes three subsections according to the three research questions 
on ARRA transportation grant acquisition, implementation, and impact. Each subsection 
presents interpretations on descriptive statistics and regression statistics. 
 
5.2.1. Grant acquisition 
 The first research question examines the effect of state government capacity on 
ARRA grant competition, controlling for other plausible factors that might affect grant 
allocation. To test the effect, I estimate the models using the dependent variable (i.e., 
amount of grants allocated to states by the federal DOT and its agencies) and explanatory 
variables encompassing government capacity components, federal politics variables, and 
state needs factors.  
 First, Table 26 presents descriptive statistics. The mean of the total obligated 
discretionary grants is $215.13 million; the standard deviation, $547.20 million, is larger 
than the mean—reflecting significant variation across states in the acquisition of grants. 
The number of DOT full-time employees per 1000 residents is 1.23 on average, and the 
largest number is 4.37. Details for the other variables are presented in the table below.  
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Table 26 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total amount of obligated competitive 
grants in $ million  215.13 547.20 2.409 3419.9 
Log (amount of competitive grants) 4.23 1.36 0.88 8.14 
Human resource capacity1: size of human 
resource 1.23 0.78 0.27 4.37 
Human resource capacity2: quality of 
human resource 8.139 1.238 6.026 12.399 
Financial resource capacity: transportation 
revenue 0.2689 0.0695 0.168 0.442 
General management capacity: policy 
experience for infrastructure management 7.9 1.87 4 12 
Previous experience: policy experience for 
grant 23.75 33.86 2.58 183.27 
House Appropriations Committee 1 1.34 1.65 0 7 
House Transportation Committee 2 1.48 1.72 0 7 
Urbanization 1.92 2.57 0.01 11.74 
Median voters 50.7 7.87 36.45 66.18 
Economic condition 5.28 1.27 3 8.3 
Note. The number of observations for all variables is 50. The statistics of all explanatory 
variables represent values in FY2008 
 
 Second, Table 27 presents the result of the log-linear regression model with 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator, which includes the six components of GC, two 
political variables, and three environmental factors in order to estimate the effect of each. 
According to the F-test (prob> F = 0.000), the null hypothesis that all coefficients are 
jointly zero is rejected. The adjusted R-squared indicates that this model explains 69% of 
the variation in the dependent variable. In addition, the model is tested to check for issues 
of multicollinearity, heteroskedasticity, and omitted variable. The Variance Inflation Factor 
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(VIF)39 indicates “the degree to which the variance has been inflated because regressor k 
is not orthogonal to the other regression” (Baum, 2006, p. 85), and if the largest value of 
VIF is smaller than 10, the probability of a collinearity problem is low. In the model, all 
VIF is smaller than 3.2, indicating no evidence of multicollinearity. Moreover, the Breusch-
Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test is run for heteroskedasticity40, in which the null hypothesis 
that assumes constant variance is not rejected. Finally, according to the Ramsey RESET 
test41, the null hypothesis that assumes no omitted variables in the model is also not rejected.  
 Turning to the effects of the explanatory variables in Table 27, the components of 
GC—human resource capacity 1 & 2 and general management capacity—are associated 
with grant acquisitions of state governments. Other components do not indicate significant 
effects.  
 The two human resource capacity components indicate different effects on the 
amount of grants. Human resource capacity 2—quality of human resource, measured by 
payrolls of full-time DOT employees compared to state median income—is statistically 
and positively significant for acquiring grants. In other words, governments that have 
higher quality labor forces, or treat their employees generously, are more likely to acquire 
larger grants. Specifically, the expected change in log of ARRA grant increases by 0.4655 
with respect to a one-unit change of human resource capacity 2, holding all other variables 
constant. In other words, the one-unit change of human resource 2 augments ARRA grant 
39 Stata syntax is vif. 
40 Stata syntax is hettest, iid. In the result, chi2(1)=0.18, Prob > chi2 = 0.6707 
41 Stata syntax is ovtest. In the result, F(3, 36) = 0.47, Prob > F = 0.7047 
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acquisition by 59.28%. However, human resource capacity 1—size of the human 
resource—has negative effects on grant acquisition. Per additional unit change of the size 
of full-time employees, the amount of grants decreases approximately by 45.23%, 
calculated by 100 x (e-0.602-1). This implies that a large government does not have an 
advantage in acquiring grants. Meanwhile, the results indicate previous experience is 
positively significant on grant competition, which means states that acquired more grants 
than other states are likely to obtain ARRA grants. 
 
Table 27 Predicting the Effect of Government Capacity on Grant Acquisition 
 Coef. S.E. Standardized 
Beta Coef. 
Human resource capacity1: size of human 
resource 
-0.602*** 0.190 -0.345 
Human resource capacity2: quality of human 
resource 
0.4655*** 1.245 0.423 
Financial resource capacity: transportation 
expenditure 
-0.007 2.150 -0.000 
General management capacity: policy 
experience for infrastructure management 
0.075 0.065 0.102 
Previous experience: policy experience for 
grant 
0.014*** 0.005 0.336 
House Appropriations Committee -0.123 0.120 -0.149 
House Transportation Committee 0.293*** 0.099 0.369 
Urbanization -0.035 0.054 -0.066 
Economic condition 0.038 0.127 0.353 
Median voters 0.025 0.019 0.142 
Constant -1.380 1.702 . 
    
Number of Observations 50   
Prob>F 0.000   
Adjusted R-squared 0.6813   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
50 states. All regressors reflect values in 2008  
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 In terms of control variables, the results show that political factors do shape the 
outcome of grant competitions. Consistent with prior research, we find support for the Pork 
Barrel hypothesis, which has been discussed and tested in a number political science 
studies. Members of the House Committee on Transportation are likely to exercise their 
political leverage to benefit their own states, as suggested by the positive and statistically 
significant coefficient of the House Transportation Committee variable. Yet, 
representatives sitting on the Appropriations Committee do not seem to exercise much 
influence on the outcomes of grant competitions. The other control variables are not 
statistically significant. 
 Admittedly, arguments of public administration and political science do make 
sense, according to the results that show statistical significance of GC and federal politics 
variables. So, the present study intends to demonstrate which factor has greater effects on 
ARRA grant competition. Standardized beta coefficients can facilitate this objective, as the 
beta coefficient of each explanatory variable indicates how many standard deviations of 
the dependent variable would change given one standard deviation change in independent 
variables. Thus, the beta coefficient of human resource capacity 2 (0.423) is larger than the 
beta coefficient of the Transportation Committee variable (0.369), which implies that the 
impact of GC is greater than the impact of federal politics in grant competition. 
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5.2.2. Grant Implementation 
 The second research question concerns grant implementation. This study 
investigates whether states did right to meet the purpose of the ARRA grants, which aimed 
to facilitate economic recovery through government expenditure and rapid spending by 
recipient governments. Consequently, I tested if government capacity played an important 
role in the pacing of grant implementation.  
 To test this research question, I set three dependent variables: total grant 
implementation rate, discretionary grant implementation rate, and formula grant 
implementation rate. As presented in Table 28, total grant implementation rates, which 
were calculated as ARRA grant outlays over obligations and expressed as percentage points, 
have a mean value of 71.77% and standard deviation of 27.24%. The implementation rate 
of discretionary grants is 63.53% (mean) and the rate of formula grants is 75.65%, which 
indicate that state governments more easily spent formula grants, compared to 
discretionary grants. 
 Aside from variables that were used in the grant acquisition model, several 
variables that affect government spending were controlled. Republican governors occupy 
half of the 50 states. Divided governments, in which the governor’s political party did not 
control both houses in the legislature, existed in less than 25 states. The percentage of states 
with Republican-controlled legislatures was 38%. Fiscal institutions, such as TELs, were 
also utilized to predict the ARRA grant implementation rate. 
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Table 28 Descriptive statistics on Grant Implementation (2009-2012) 
Variable Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Total Implementation 71.77  27.24  4.32  100 
Discretionary Grant Implementation 63.53  30.14  0 100 
Formula Grant Implementation 75.65  28.62  3.75  100 
Human resource capacity1: size of human 
resource 
1.18  0.77  0.24  4.37  
Human resource capacity2: quality of 
human resource 
8.439  1.303  5.86  12.889  
Financial resource capacity: transportation 
revenue 
0.261  0.072  0.157 0.558 
General management capacity: policy 
experience for infrastructure management 
7.9 1.85  4 12 
Previous experience: policy experience for 
grant 
30.02  48.86  0 411.77  
Urbanization 194.34  257.36  1.20  1196.71 
Median voters 50.537 7.929  35.078 71.122 
Economic condition 7.57  2.18  3 13.8 
Governor’s propensity (Republican) 0.5 0.50  0 1 
Divided government 0.43  0.50  0 1 
Republican legislature 0.38  0.49  0 1 
TELs 8.34 7.88  0 25 
BBRs 2.44 0.806 0 3 
Note. The number of observations for all variables is 200. The statistics of all explanatory 
variables represent one-year lagged values, except time-invariant variables (General 
management capacity, TEL, and BBR) 
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 To estimate models, I use the Panel Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) technique, 
because autocorrelation occurs in all models42 and heteroscedasticity occurs in Models 243. 
PCSE is appropriate in this case because it allows me to account for the heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation problems in the data. Table 29 presents the regression results—using 
data covering 2009-2012—from three models with three dependent variables: 
discretionary grant implementation rate, formula grant implementation rate, and total grant 
implementation rate. 
 I start with the independent variables (i.e., the components of government capacity) 
to explain the regression results. First, the results show that human resource capacity 1—
size of human resource—is positively and statistically significant on the dependent 
variables in Model 3. Specifically, one additional unit change in the number of DOT full-
time employees per 1000 residents increases the percentage point of implementation rate 
of total grants by approximately 5.15, holding other variables constant. Though 
discretionary grant implementation is affected by human resource capacity 1, in which the 
coefficient is 2.544, it is not statistically significant. Meanwhile, human resource capacity 
2—which indicates the competence of DOT employees measured by the relative 
remuneration level compared to median income—seems to have positive effects on grant 
implementation (formula and total grant); however, it is not statistically significant. Second, 
42  Wooldridge test is conducted, in which the null hypothesis is that there is no first-order 
autocorrelation. Test results reveal the null hypotheses for all models are rejected, which means all 
models probably have the first-order autocorrelation.  
43 Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test is run for checking the challenge of heteroskedasticity. The 
test reports Model 2 has the problem of heteroskedasticity, based on the results, chi2(1)=0.00 and Prob 
> chi2 = 0.9790.  
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per capita transportation own source, as the proxy of financial resource capacity, is 
positively associated with formula and total grants and its effect is statistically significant. 
Third, general management capacity, reflecting infrastructure management, is the other GC 
component that has significant effect on formula grant implementation. In sum, greater size 
of administration, more revenue sources, and more experience in handling federal grants 
are likely to serve state governments well in rapid grant implementation.     
 One interesting point, which emerged from the empirical evidence of GC in all 
models, is the effect of financial resource capacity. As seen in Tables 29, financial resource 
capacity (transportation revenue) is associated only with formula and total grants. A 
possible explanation for why the positive effect of financial resource capacity is significant 
only in formula and total grants relates to the nature of funding system. Discretionary grants 
under ARRA are primarily for new projects and allocated by the review of applications; 
however, a formula grant is normally for current projects or maintenance, and is 
automatically distributed following the federal DOT’s specified formula. So, the 
predictable fund (i.e., a formula-based grant) is likely statistically associated with the ratio 
of own source revenue—compared to the less predictable fund: competitive grant. 
Moreover, the amount of discretionary grant program is approximately one-tenth of 
formula-based grants, which means that discretionary grants would not likely have 
statistical relation with own source revenue. 
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Table 29 Predicting the Effect of Government Capacity on Grant Implementation  
Implementation Discretionary(Model 1) Formula (Model 2) Total (Model 3) Coef. S.E Coef. S.E Coef. S.E 
Human resource 
capacity1 
2.544 4.037 1.989 2.875 5.153** 2.303 
Human resource 
capacity2 
-1.4374 2.556 1.6077 1.5278 0.7447 1.6702 
Financial resource 
capacity 
5.947 39.64 192.67*** 34.746 153.25*** 34.309 
General 
management 
capacity 
-2.104 1.439 1.013 1.427 1.297 0.824 
Previous 
experience  
0.030 0.044 0.108*** 0.035 0.103** 0.050 
Urbanization -0.041*** 0.009 -0.042** 0.018 -0.039* 0.021 
Economic 
Condition 
1.180 1.027 12.125*** 0.653 10.679*** 2.029 
Median voter 0.395 0.302 0.541* 0.288 0.465* 0.246 
Republican 
Governor 
4.855 4.285 1.468 2.865 2.970 2.056 
Divided 
government 
-0.713 4.077 -3.353 2.686 -3.173 2.891 
Republican 
legislature 
10.551* 5.791 18.416*** 3.746 19.327*** 4.919 
BBRs 0.282 2.989 -4.964** 2.324 -4.989** 2.433 
TELs 0.145 0.168 -1.321*** 0.279 -1.281*** 0.241 
Constant 53.058* 31.48 -106.8*** 24.982 -86.421** 37.215 
Number of 
Observations 196  196 
 196  
Number of groups 49  49  49  
R2 0.6424  0.5676  0.6393  
Prob> chi2  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Note. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. S.E. indicates panel corrected standard error in 
Model 1 & 3, and heteroskedastic corrected standard error in Model 2. Time period: 4 
waves (2009-2012). 49 states (Nebraska was omitted.). Human resource capacity1: size of 
human resource, Human resource capacity2: quality of human resource, Financial resource 
capacity: transportation revenue, General management capacity: policy experience on 
infrastructure management, Previous experience: policy experience on grant 
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 For control variables’ impact on grant implementation pace, three variables 
representing state needs are reported as they are statistically significant in explaining 
dependent variables. Population density, the proxy of urbanization, has a negative effect, 
which indicates that more urbanized states will have correspondingly less success in 
implementing ARRA grants in a timely manner. The positive effect of economic condition 
is statistically significant in Model 2 and 3, which implies that higher unemployment rates 
induce state governments to implement ARRA grants quickly as a mechanism of 
stimulative economic policy. Finally, the median voter variable affects formula and total 
grants, which indicates that higher level of median income increases the pace of grant 
implementation. Additionally, according to the regression results, state politics are 
somewhat meaningful. Legislature control by Republicans is a variable that shows 
statistically strong evidence for explaining the dependent variable because the variable’s 
p-value is less than 1% of the significance level in Models 2 and 3. This implies that 
Republicans in the legislature are likely to support the rapid implementation of grants. 
However, divided government, meaning the governor’s political party does not control at 
least one house in the legislature, has no significant effects. Republican governor also did 
not have statistically significant effects. Lastly, the other control variable, fiscal institution, 
shows negative effects on formula and total grants. This is consistent with intuition and 
prior literature in that stringent rules for financial management would hinder governments 
in the disbursement of funds. 
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5.2.3. Grant Impact on Government Expenditure 
 This section presents the impact of ARRA grants on recipient government 
expenditures. I categorized ARRA grants, the independent variable, into discretionary and 
formula grants. Also, I classified expenditure, the dependent variable, into capital outlays, 
current operation expenditure, and total expenditure. Empirical tests in this section 
investigated if discretionary and formula grants affected state governments’ three 
expenditures on transportation.  
 First, I determined how many states increased, in nominal terms, their 
transportation expenditure since the Great Recession. Table 30 shows that thirty-one states 
increased expenditure on transportation in FY 2009, compared to FY 2008. In FY 2010 and 
FY 2011, thirty-three and twenty-six states, respectively, expanded their spending. 
Specifically, when examining the two categories of expenditure (capital outlays and current 
operation), states tended to increase funds for capital outlays, rather than for current 
operation since FY 2008. In FY 2009, the number of states that increased funds on capital 
outlays was thirty-one, however only twenty-six states expanded their spending on current 
operation. Moreover, the statistics show the number of states that spent more money on 
transportation, whichever the expenditure is of total, capital or current operation, slightly 
declined from FY 2009 to FY 2011. This implies that states on the whole did not implement 
expansionary fiscal policies on transportation, because the shock of the Great Recession 
affected states even after the end of the recession.  
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Table 30 Number of states that expand spending 
Variable 2009 2010 2011 
Recovery in transportation total expenditure  31 33 26 
Recovery in transportation capital outlays  31 31 26 
Recovery in transportation current operation  26 24 21 
 
 I now present descriptive statistics of variables that were used in the regression 
models. First, state government expenditures, which are adjusted to real values in 2012 
dollars and standardized by the number of residents, were organized into six types. 
Recovery amount in transportation of total expenditure, measured by the difference of 
transportation expenditure in each fiscal year and FY 2008, has a mean value of $17.59 
during the post-recession period (2009-2011).The mean value of recovery in capital 
outlays— measured by the same method used for total transportation expenditure 
recovery—was $16.49. However, the amount of recovery in current operation expenditure 
after the recession in 2008 was -$1.83 as the mean during the three years. For the evidence 
of the mean values of three recovery variables in Table 31 and the tendency of spending 
expansion in Table 30, the study interprets them as states were not sufficiently recovered 
for the three years of the post-recession.  
 Third, the mean of total transportation expenditure was $498.46 for the three years 
spanning FY 2009-2011; the mean of capital outlays for transportation was $289.98, and 
the mean of current operation expenditure was $147.79. Approximately 58% of 
transportation expenditure was used for capital outlays. 
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Table 31 Descriptive statistics on Grant Impact 
Variable Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Recovery in transportation total 
expenditure  
17.590  72.803  -165.45  322.105  
Recovery in transportation capital 
outlays  
16.493  63.846  -163.14  217.964  
Recovery in transportation current 
operation  
-1.833  23.494  -118.60  58.402  
Total transportation expenditure  498.455  290.811  195.673  2210.536  
Transportation Capital outlays 289.983  172.954  84.903  1222.667  
Transportation current operation 
expenditure 
147.787  140.479  46.522  1022.134  
ARRA discretionary grants outlays 9.286  14.931  0 114.255  
ARRA formula grants outlays 84.490  60.422  4.225  297.483  
Human resource capacity1: size of 
human resource 
1.202  0.767  0.237  4.371  
Human resource capacity2: quality of 
human resource 
8.36  1.27  5.86  12.40  
Financial resource capacity: 
transportation revenue 
0.262  0.070  0.157  0.464  
General management capacity: policy 
experience for infrastructure 
management 
7.9 1.853  4 12 
Urbanization 1.932  2.567  0.012  11.869  
Median voters 50.117  7.604  35.078 66.6332 
Economic condition 7.481  2.371  3 13.8 
Governor’s propensity (Republican)  0.447  0.499  0 1 
Divided government 0.486  0.502  0 1 
Republican legislature  0.286  0.453  0 1 
TELs 8.34 7.889  0 25 
BBRs 2.44 0.806 0 3 
Legislature Control 0.000  0.294  -1.032  0.483  
Note. The number of observations for all variables is 150. The statistics of all explanatory 
variables represent one-year lagged values, except time-invariant variables (general 
management capacity, TEL, and legislature control) 
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 Fourth, following the explanatory variables that were presented in the first and the 
second research questions and results, Table 31 presents fiscal institutions, legislature 
control of bureaucracy, and the received ARRA grants. Stringency of TELs has a score of 
8.34 out of 25 as its mean value, which implies that states do not have particularly strict 
rules on TELs. The mean of per capita ARRA discretionary grants for transportation was 
$9.29 and its standard deviation was $14.93, which indicates substantial variation across 
recipients. The ARRA formula grants’ mean was $84.49, which is nearly nine times greater 
than that of discretionary grants. 
 Turning to the results of the regression models, I present two different perspectives. 
One concerns which factors affect expenditure recovery (Table 32), and the other concerns 
general determinants analysis (Table 33), focusing on the three years of post-recession. The 
effects of the explanatory variables were estimated using linear regression with the Panel 
Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) estimator. Models 1-6 have heteroscedasticity 44 
problems and Models 1-2 have additional issues of autocorrelation45. To manage these 
problems, I used the PCSE technique, assuming panel-level heteroskedastic errors and 
panel-specific AR1 autocorrelation structure.  
 
 
44 Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg tests for checking the challenge of heteroskedasticity indicate all 
models have heteroscedasticity.  
45 To check autocorrelation, Wooldridge test is conducted. Its null hypothesis is that there is no first-
order autocorrelation. The test for Model 1 shows F(1, 48)=5.191 and Prob>F=0.027, and for Model 2 
shows F(1, 48)=10.363 and Prob>F=0.0023. The test results mean that the null hypothesis is rejected 
and there is autocorrelation. 
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Table 32 Predicting the Effect of GC and Grants on Expenditure Recovery 
Recovery Total (Model1) 
Capital Outlays 
(Model 2) 
Current 
expenditure 
(Model 3) 
Coef. S.E Coef. S.E Coef. S.E 
ARRA discretionary 
grant outlays 
1.108* 0.651 1.298** 0.639 0.189 0.316 
ARRA formula grant 
outlays 
-0.201 0.133 0.030 0.121 -0.138 0.090 
HR capacity1 -27.4*** 9.904 -18.80** 8.466 -3.884 4.556 
HR capacity2 6.271 4.151 6.549* 3.378 3.774** 1.482 
Financial resource 
capacity 
546.46*** 108.07 346.8*** 101.83 110.74*** 35.50 
General management 
capacity  
-1.826 3.322 1.439 3.632 -2.199** 0.854 
Urbanization  -8.92*** 3.296 -6.861** 2.728 -2.294** 1.016 
Economic Condition  -2.824 1.748 -2.301 1.536 -0.939 0.718 
Median voter  -2.01*** 0.755 -0.857 0.631 -0.508 0.317 
Governor’s 
propensity(Republica
n) 
21.240** 9.775 7.334 10.330 14.32*** 4.745 
Divided government 10.258 11.173 1.982 9.547 0.157 4.450 
Republican 
legislature  
18.304 12.533 27.637** 11.653 -5.109 6.001 
TELs -1.291* 0.736 -1.481** 0.699 0.052 0.241 
BBRs -4.064 6.118 -0.339 6.522 -0.012 2.231 
Legislature Control 0.739 21.363 17.172 20.082 -4.079 6.420 
Constant 10.470 63.017 -47.968 55.790 -4.207 28.43 
Number of 
Observations 147  147 
 147  
Number of groups 49  49  49  
R2 0.7275  0.4430  0.2995  
Prob> chi2  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Note. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. S.E indicates heteroskedastic corrected standard 
error. Time period: 3 waves (2009-2011). 49 states (Nebraska was omitted.). HR capacity1: 
size of human resource, HR capacity2: quality of human resource, Financial resource 
capacity: transportation revenue, General management capacity: policy experience on 
infrastructure management 
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 Expenditure recovery is depicted in Table 32. Models 1-3 explain the recovery as 
a function of ARRA grants outlay, GC, state needs, state politics, and fiscal institutions. 
The first point of interpretation is the effect of grant. Discretionary grants did affect 
expenditure recovery for the three years (2009-2011), whereas formula grants were not 
statistically significant in expenditure recovery. One possible explanation can be adduced 
to interpret the result. Although the amount of discretionary grants is much smaller than 
formula grants, the achievement of competitive grants implies recipients’ positive 
willingness to spend the grant, which played an important role in the recovery. In addition 
to the effectiveness of discretionary grants, one interesting point is that ARRA competitive 
grants affected only capital outlays and total expenditure. According to Census statistics, 
capital outlays indicate construction, replacement, addition, and other improvement. 
Expenditure for repairs is classified as a current operation expenditure. Thus, we can 
explain that ARRA competitive grants induced states to spend more funds on capital 
investments.  
 Second, GC components have substantial effects on the recovery. Surprisingly, 
human resource capacity 1 negatively affected the recovery. When holding other variable 
constant, additional increase in the size of human resource decreases the total expenditure 
recovery (per capita) by $27.42. Meanwhile, financial resource capacity had positive 
effects on all kinds of expenditures recovery. That is, the more own-source revenue for 
transportation a state has, the greater recovery it achieves. 
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Table 33 Predicting the Effect of Government Capacity and Grants on Expenditure 
Expenditure Total (Model 4) 
Capital Outlays 
(Model 5) 
Current 
expenditure 
(Model 6) 
Coef. S.E Coef. S.E Coef. S.E 
ARRA discretionary 
grant outlays 
5.861** 2.692 3.010* 1.695 3.483** 1.559 
ARRA formula 
grant outlays 
0.304 0.576 0.397 0.374 -0.285 0.298 
HR capacity1 226.23*** 34.770 132.39*** 19.261 119.03*** 18.224 
HR capacity2  20.490 13.245 10.459 8.725 3.100 6.038 
Financial resource 
capacity 
774.42*** 244.953 438.77** 182.88 134.225 110.31 
General 
management 
capacity 
0.014 7.073 4.282 4.297 -8.488** 3.910 
Urbanization  -37.19*** 6.419 -14.83*** 3.905 -13.53*** 3.634 
Economic Condition  -2.517 5.145 -6.987* 3.763 4.344* 2.506 
Median voter  7.234*** 2.131 0.809 1.353 5.089*** 1.127 
Governor’s 
propensity 
56.941** 22.722 23.705 18.085 27.065** 11.651 
Divided government 54.709** 22.334 12.400 17.592 30.389*** 10.739 
Republican 
legislature  
47.493* 26.772 38.376* 19.713 6.030 11.851 
TELs 1.525 1.542 2.039* 1.205 0.487 0.830 
BBRs 33.681** 14.845 24.487** 11.113 3.379 8.242 
Legislature Control -57.385 37.982 -37.381 30.212 -3.712 19.798 
Constant -615.56*** 192.073 -198.480 129.86 -294.6*** 92.002 
Number of 
Observations 147  147 
 147  
Number of groups 49  49  49  
R2 0.8419  0.7696  0.8462  
Prob> chi2  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Note. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. S.E indicates heteroskedastic corrected standard 
error. Time period: 3 waves (2009-2011). 49 states (Nebraska was omitted.). HR capacity1: 
size of human resource, HR capacity2: quality of human resource, Financial resource 
capacity: transportation revenue, General management capacity: policy experience on 
infrastructure management 
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 Compared to the recovery, determinants of expenditure during the three post- 
recession years present different results (Table 33). First, discretionary ARRA grants were 
statistically significant. Second, human resource capacity 1 is also differently reported as 
it had positive effects on expenditure, compared to negative effects on recovery. Third, 
fiscal institutions, TELs and BBRs, were statistically significant on expenditure. They 
positively affected expenditure, which indicates that stringent fiscal institutions 
paradoxically help to increase government spending. Lastly, divided states were likely to 
increase expenditure compared to unitary states, according to Models 4 and 6. 
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Chapter VI. CONCLUSION 
6.1. Summary and discussion 
This dissertation aimed to determine the significance of government capacity (GC), 
specifically as a factor in easing the impacts of the recent economic crisis. Taking ARRA 
grants as the research case, this dissertation began with a literature review (Chapter II) of 
the three stages of an ARRA grant: grant competition, implementation, and impact. The 
review revealed gaps in literature pertaining to the lack of theoretical background for the 
link between GC and performance and for the concept and measurement of GC. Chapter 
III proposed theoretical backgrounds for the link and the concept. Based on Systems 
Theory and Resource Based Theory (RBT), I then established the theoretical framework. 
Referring to previous literature, for the present study, I defined the concept of GC as the 
ability of a government to outperform others in the acquisition of grant, the implementation 
of grant, and the recovery of expenditure. To measure GC in this study, we use its 
components: human resource as human resource capacity 1 (the size of human resource), 
human resource capacity 2 (the quality of human resource); financial resource as financial 
resource capacity; and intellectual ability as general management capacity (infrastructure 
management) and previous experience (grant experience). Then, Chapters IV and V 
presented empirical models and results. The following sections provide the test results and 
discussions. 
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6.1.1. Grant acquisition 
 The first empirical model examines factors that affect ARRA grant competition. 
Utilizing the case of federal transportation grants under the Recovery Act, the study 
established a model of discretionary grants with independent variables—human resource 
capacity, financial resource, and intangible resource capacity. The model covers political 
variables following the political science literature and other environmental variables.  
 From the evidence of the quantitative analysis (Table 34), two government 
capacity components—human resource capacity 2 and previous experience—positively 
affect grant acquisition. Another component of capacity, human resource capacity 1, has a 
negative effect. The results partially support the government capacity hypothesis in which 
higher capacity is helpful for acquiring competitive grants. 
 There is another perspective on explaining the conflicting results between HR 
capacity 1 and 2. This is consistent with the implication of cutback management or 
turnaround management. Ukeles (1982) stressed efficient and effective management under 
constraints of resources, based on his experience in New York City that reduced the 
administrative body but achieved the successful rescue in the crisis. It implies “working 
smarter” or “doing more with less” is more important than the size of resources. According 
to the implication, the negative effect of HR capacity 1 and the positive effect of HR 
capacity 2 are natural results, implying that HR quality is more important in the crisis than 
HR size. 
 Financial resource capacity did not have significant effects on the grant acquisition, 
and the direction of effects was negative. The result may be due to “decreased demand for 
108 
external funding” (Hall, 2008a, p. 14), which means affluent states with sufficient financial 
resources are likely to be passive about federal grant applications. Or the result may be 
attributable to a redistributive function of ARRA grants that supports economically 
disadvantaged regions (Gimpel et al., 2012; Young & Sobel, 2013). 
 Positive effects of policy experience are in line with prior literature (e.g., Rich, 
1989). Abilities in professional grant writing and appropriate planning are cultivated by 
relevant experience on grant applications. Thus it is natural that the result indicates 
previous experience variable had positively and statistically significant effects on the grant 
acquisition.  
 
Table 34 Summary of tests for grant acquisition 
 sign of 
effect 
Standardized 
Beta Coef. 
Human resource capacity1: size of human resource - -0.345 
Human resource capacity2: quality of human resource + 0.423 
Financial resource capacity: transportation expenditure   
General management capacity: policy experience for 
infrastructure management 
  
Previous experience: policy experience for grant + 0.336 
House Appropriations Committee   
House Transportation Committee + 0.369 
Urbanization   
Economic condition   
Median voters   
 
 As a control variable, the number of House Transportation Committee members 
from each state is reported as having a positive effect on grant acquisition, which means 
the Pork Barrel hypothesis is still valid. However, the other political variable, House 
Appropriations Committee, is not significant; so the hypothesis is also partially supported. 
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The more interesting result between the government capacity variables and the political 
variables concerns the Standardized Beta Coefficients. According to the results, the Beta 
Coefficient of HR capacity 2 is greater than that of the House Transportation Committee 
variable. These results do not mean only GC matter or politics is not important. As Hall 
(2008a) said, the results imply government capacity is a more important factor in the grant 
competition situation or, at least, it is not less important than the political factor.  
 
6.1.2. Grant Implementation 
 I conducted analyses to investigate whether or not government capacity affects 
ARRA grant fund implementation in order to answer the second research question. Speedy 
implementation of ARRA funds by recipient governments is an indicator of performance 
(to evaluate success), because the Recovery Act aimed to stimulate the economy and to 
recover subnational governments’ spending.  
 For the models of the second research question, I inputted government capacity 
variables—human resource capacity, financial resource capacity, and intangible resource 
capacity— and control variables to explain the variation of ARRA fund implementation. 
To compare types of grant, I separately regressed discretionary grants, formula grants, and 
total grants. 
 As seen in Table 35, data and results of the quantitative analyses indicate that 
human resource capacity and financial resource capacity have statistically significant 
effects on the dependent variables. Moreover, intangible resource capacity (previous 
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experience), measured by the amount of previous funds, is shown to facilitate speedy 
implementation during the four years since the ARRA subsidies. Those results are 
consistent with prior literature (Carley et al., 2015; Terman and Feiock, 2014). Carley et al. 
(2015) also found evidence on the positive effects of relevant experience and financial 
management capacity on energy grant implementation. Terman and Feiock (2014) revealed 
a negative association between lack of staff capacity and implementation delay.  
 
Table 35 Summary of tests for grant implementation 
Implementation Competitive  
(Model 1) 
Formula  
(Model 2) 
Total  
(Model 3) 
Human resource capacity1   + 
Human resource capacity2    
Financial resource capacity  + + 
General management capacity    
Previous experience   + + 
Urbanization - - - 
Economic Condition  + + 
Median voter  + + 
Republican Governor    
Divided government    
Republican legislature + + + 
BBRs  - - 
TELs  - - 
 
 Additionally, states that were less urbanized, faced higher unemployment rates, 
and had higher median income are likely to spend the ARRA funds faster than others. This 
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implies that these states outperformed—in terms of speedy implementation—other states 
that were more urbanized, experienced lower unemployment, and had lower median 
income level. Moreover, states with Republican legislature control were more likely to 
spend ARRA funds faster than others with Democratic control of legislature. This is a 
somewhat different result from the thought that democratic states might have “higher goal 
alignments” with the Democratic president’s policy (e.g., Carley et al., 2015; Jennings et 
al 2012). Lastly, my data found that more stringent fiscal institutions (TELs and BBRs) 
impeded fast implementation, which is consistent with prior literature (Hou & Smith, 2010; 
Mahdavi & Westerlund, 2011; Maher & Deller, 2012). From the results of fiscal institutions, 
this dissertation does not want to assert that TELs and BBRs are unnecessary rules for the 
efficient policy implementation. Rather, the negative statistical association indicates that 
the institutions fulfill the roles given to themselves even in the crisis.  
 
6.1.3. Grant Impact and Government Expenditure 
 The third research question concerned the impact of ARRA grants on recipient 
government expenditures. According to the data, had the federal government failed to 
provide fiscal assistance, states would have encountered severe deficits and would have 
been forced to cut expenditures on most public services. If so, the intellectual curiosity 
would be about how much the federal ARRA grants affected states’ recovery of expenditure. 
Thus, this study examined the impact of ARRA grants on the recovery (2009-2011) and on 
expenditures (2009-2011), in which the recovery and expenditures were categorized into 
total, capital and current operation. 
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 In terms of dependent variables, the study set recovery variables as the amount of 
change in transportation expenditure (total, capital, and current) between each year and FY 
2008, and expenditure as each year’s transportation expenditure. Key independent 
variables are ARRA discretionary grants and ARRA formula grants. I classified these 
variables to test effects of the two grants allocated by different method and process. In 
addition, I investigated whether or not government capacity had effects on the recovery 
and expenditures.  
 According to the test results (Table 36), between the two ARRA grant-types only 
discretionary grants had statistically significant on and positively affected expenditure 
recovery and transportation investment. This implies that despite having relatively smaller 
dollar-amounts of subsidy, the acquired competitive grant was more effective than the 
distributed formula grant as a stimulus to increase spending. These results may come from 
the nature of different types of grants. Formula grants are allocated by the pre-existing 
criteria that recipients anticipate how much they can receive. So, formula grants are likely 
to be used in current operation and ongoing projects. In contrast, subnational government 
must prepare a project by a well-designed plan in order to apply for a competitive grant. 
So, competitive grants are likely to induce recipients to spend funds on capital outlays and 
new projects. In addition, the result indicates that ARRA grants increased transportation 
expenditures. This result rebuts Knight (2002) that insisted crowding-out effects of the 
federal highway grants. 
 Turning to GC components, the regression results show their coefficients are 
significant on both transportation expenditure recovery and investment. Financial resource 
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capacity’s positive effects were consistently significant on recovery and expenditures. 
Because financial resource indicates transportation revenue, states with a higher level of 
resources can increase transportation expenditures more than ones with a lower level of 
resources. Human resource (HR) capacities showed contradictory results. HR capacity 2 
had statistically and positively significant effects only on expenditure recovery. HR 
capacity 1 had negative effects on recovery, but positive effects on expenditure. 
Expenditure recovery and transportation investment are all significant purposes of ARRA. 
However, in the crisis situation, the more important thing or the higher priority was to 
recover subnational governments’ expenditure level at least on the same plane as the pre-
recession level. In this perspective, the regression results imply that the quality of HR, 
rather than HR size, was more helpful for overcoming the recession.  
 For other control variables, similar to the test results of implementation, less 
urbanized states were likely to do well in recovery and spend more. It implies that 
presumably, more urbanized states had more difficulty than less urbanized ones in 
implementing grants and recovering expenditure due to more complicated conditions. 
Regarding political propensity, Republican states tended to have advantages in the recovery 
and the expansion of expenditure—according to the coefficients of political variables. In 
addition, the variable, BBRs, was reported as leverages to increase transportation 
expenditures. This result seemingly contradicts prior studies. However, possible answers 
can be made, when focusing on the different dependent variable and the analysis case. 
Previous literature (e.g., Alt & Lowry, 1994; Hou & Smith, 2010; Mahdavi & Westerlund, 
2011; Poterba, 1994) revealed BBRs were positively associated with ‘fund balance.’ The 
analytic model dealt with 2009-2011 when federal grants influx sharply increased and 
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states continued to increase expenditure. Or maybe states with the fiscal institutions (i.e. 
BBRs and TELs) learn to manage their finances better with less. Thus, it is possible that 
the regression result of BBR is not wholly contrary to the prior literature.    
 
Table 36 Summary of tests for grant impact 
 
Expenditure Recovery  
(Model 1-3) 
Transportation Investment  
(Model 4-6) 
Total Capital Current Total Capital Current 
ARRA discretionary grant + +  + + + 
ARRA formula grant       
Human resource capacity1 - -  + + + 
Human resource capacity2  + +    
Financial resource capacity + + + + +  
General management capacity    -   - 
Urbanization  - - - - - - 
Economic Condition      - + 
Median voter  -   +  + 
Governor’s propensity 
(Republican)  
+  + +  + 
Divided government    +  + 
Republican legislature   +  + +  
TELs - -   +  
BBRs    + +  
Legislature Control       
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6.2. Conclusion 
 This dissertation began with questions about government capacity and its role in 
the critical situation experienced by all states globally: the significant economic shock of 
the Great Recession. Through the quantitative multivariate analyses, I found strong 
evidence of the impact of government capacity. 
 Overall, government capacity of states played a significant role in the conjuncture 
of ARRA situation. For states with higher government capacity, strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities, and threats (SWOT) analysis was used to explain how their strength (S) of 
capacity turned the threat (T) of the Great Recession to their advantage for opportunity (O) 
for restoration and development—compensating for weakness (W). However, according to 
types of capacity and to phases of the ARRA funds (acquisition, implementation, and 
impact), the effects of capacity were shown to be somewhat different.  
 Specifically, the size of human resource (human resource capacity 1) was not 
helpful for acquiring ARRA grants, but was meaningful for ARRA implementation and the 
expansion of expenditures. The quality of human resource (human resource capacity 2) 
played an important role in grant acquisition and recovery, but was not significant in 
implementation. Financial resource capacity was not significantly different from zero in 
grant competition, but consistently positively significant in ARRA grant implementation 
and recovery and the increase of expenditure. As an intangible resource, infrastructure 
management experience (general management capacity) was mostly insignificant for all 
ARRA phases—except the negative effects on recovery and expenditure in current 
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operation. Grant experience (previous experience) was positively significant on grant 
acquisition and implementation for formula and total grants.  
 
6.2.1. Policy implication 
 From the empirical test results described above, I found some policy implications. 
First, the empirical findings show that internal system factors (i.e., GC components) had 
statistically significant impacts. Based on the results and Systems Theory, the present study 
recommends that subnational governments concentrate on what they do by themselves at 
first rather than what they cannot deal with. For example, governments can control or 
develop their capacity, but it is too difficult to influence other external factors, such as 
federal actions including federal politics and federal bureaucrats. This study does not intend 
to imply that only GC is important or that GC is significantly more critical than other 
factors; however, the study does argue that subnational governments benefit from prior 
focus on their internal system because they have direct control of this system and thus, they 
can effectively manage and refine it in a relatively short time period.  
 Second, in terms of effects of human resources (HR), the findings indicate the 
quality of HR—measured by the relative level of compensation—played a significant role 
in the acquisition of ARRA grants and expenditure recovery, whereas the size of HR did 
not. This indicates that the quality of HR is more important than the size in coping with 
crisis. For enhancing government capacity, especially HR capacity, governments may aim 
to increase the number of employees or increase the quality of employees. The empirical 
results imply that it is better to focus on quality rather than size. Of course, the relatively 
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higher level of compensation may attribute to the higher educated employees or generous 
treatment with higher level of salary. In any case, governments would benefit in that higher 
educated employees would be likely to produce better outputs and generous treatment 
would likely increase employee morale and induce employees to succeed at their jobs.  
 Third, the empirical test reveals that another GC component, financial resource, 
was also important factor—particularly in expenditure recovery. Understandably, larger 
financial resource should be a significant capacity for government to disburse funds at a 
suitable time and place. Thus, governments must skillfully manage the system for securing 
transportation related revenue even in times of calm.  
 Lastly, the findings present interesting evidence in terms of the impact of ARRA 
grants. Although the dollar-amounts of competitive grants are much smaller than that of 
formula grants, only competitive grants had statistically and positively significant effects 
on expenditure recovery and expenditure. This implies that subnational governments must 
focus more on grant competition. Even though significantly more commitments are needed 
to plan and apply for competitive grants, competitive transportation grants may be more 
useful for governments to recover expenditure level and to invest in transportation. 
   
6.2.2. Contributions 
 I present three kinds of contributions. This dissertation contributes to the academic 
discussion of management by developing a theoretical framework to explain the link 
between GC and its performance, based on Systems Theory and Resource Based Theory 
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(RBT). It would be valuable for the current discussion in the research literature on how to 
account for the relation, in terms of theoretical background. 
 Another contribution, pertaining to government capacity, is that the present study 
provides a conceptualization for the meaning of government capacity—to classify its 
components and to operationalize the components with multiple proxies using the two 
theories. The present study improves on prior empirical studies that generally did not 
provide specific theory or that only used a simple proxy for government capacity (e.g., the 
number of public servants).  
 In terms of the target of analysis, a third contribution of this dissertation is that it 
is the first study to investigate the three stages of ARRA transportation grants. The study 
revealed that GC played an important role in ARRA grant acquisition, implementation, and 
impact. In addition, regarding intergovernmental grants issues, few studies of public 
finance have examined the acquisition and implementation of federal grants. Thus, this 
dissertation, as a start-up study on this topic, provides initial understanding of the relation 
between GC and intergovernmental grants.  
 
6.2.3. Limitations  
 Policy implication and the contributions notwithstanding, like other empirical 
studies, the present study has some weaknesses. First, this study proposes a theoretical 
framework by using two background theories: Systems Theory and RBT. Though the 
dissertation assumes that the theories can be applied to state government organizations and 
utilized lessons of theories, the theories might not be perfectly appropriate for public 
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organizations—because they were generated in the field of business administration and 
reflect the nature of private organizations.  
 Second, the operationalization of variables may not perfectly capture the nature of 
each variable. This study suggests a theoretical framework for the concept and 
measurement of GC, but it might not represent all aspects of GC. For example, I measured 
the quality of HR using the relative level of compensation for DOT employees. However, 
aside from compensation, there could be other proxies for the quality of HR, such as level 
of education, length of service of employees, degree of job-training, etc.  
 Third, this study includes a small number of observations in the quantitative 
analyses, because of the characteristic that ARRA funds are distributed as a one-time-fund. 
Especially for the analysis of the first question—the acquisition of ARRA grant—the total 
number of observations is 50. Even though this number represents the population (50 states) 
under ARRA, this empirical result can be used to explain only the recent recession 
(December 2007 – June 2009), and cannot be generalized to explain other situations.  
 Lastly, this dissertation could not sufficiently control the regional differences of 
states, such as project composition and climate. According to location and to other 
condition of states, the states have different management task complexity. The dissimilarity 
among states may affect the performance of states. Though the study employed 
urbanization, economic condition, and the level of income, I could not assert that these 
factors are adequate to control the differences. 
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6.2.4. Suggestions for Future Research 
 This dissertation presents a theoretical framework and empirical test results. As 
described in the limitations above, however, I cannot assert that the study perfectly 
characterizes the relationship between GC and performance or that the proposed theoretical 
framework and measurement sufficiently capture the characteristics of variables. The study 
provides additional evidence for—and is only one step along the path to explaining—the 
role of GC.    
 Thus, several avenues of research remain available to future studies. First, scholars 
can expand the theoretical background beyond the two theories presented here, or develop 
a critical application of the theories for public organizations. Scholars may find additional 
or alternative theories for the link between GC and performance, or suggest a more analytic 
utilization of the theories for the public sector.  
 Second, qualitative studies may remedy the caveats about the operationalization 
of GC. As described above, the quality of HR is too difficult to be measured by using data 
released to the public. Future studies should use qualitative methods, such as interviews, 
surveys, or focus groups. This would benefit and develop the research literature on public 
management. 
  Lastly, the framework of this dissertation could be replicated at the local level. It 
is possible that grant issues are more significant for local governments than for states. 
Compared to states, higher variability in GC and performance among localities is expected.  
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APPENDIX 
Survey Design and Progress 
The survey for DOTs of all 50 states was designed in order to supplement the secondary 
data analyses. As seen in appendix A, the survey questionnaire consists of three parts: grant 
application, human resource management, and transportation expenditure. I expected the 
survey would have been useful for explaining grant competition, measuring government 
capacity, and obtaining unreleased data for transportation expenditures of construction and 
maintenance. However, the survey is not utilized for the dissertation because of the low 
response rate (32%) and the quality of responses.  
 The first distribution of the survey to 50 states was on April 8th, 2016, and follow-
up invitations were sent five times, by using email and the Qualtrics system. I obtained 
contact information from each state’s DOT website and AASHTO (American Association 
of State Highway and Transportation Officials). Before September 15th, sixteen states 
answered, six states denied answering, and the other twenty-eight states ignored the survey 
invitation.  
 I decided not to use survey answers for empirical analysis in the dissertation for 
several reasons. First, the number of responses was too small to utilize for regression 
models. Second, some respondents didn’t answer several questions or left a few questions 
as N/A. Lastly, I discerned there are unreliable answers. For example, though question 1a 
(external consultant effort) and 1b (staffing effort) are related to each other, some states 
answered inconsistently. Albeit the shortcomings, however, I report survey questionnaires 
and the descriptive results of the survey for readers who might be interested.  
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Survey Questionnaire 
Part 1: Please answer the following five questions about your agency federal grant 
applications. 
 
Q1: Some transportation agencies rely on little or no external technical assistance when 
they apply for federal grants. Other agencies utilize significant amount of external 
expertise for these applications. 
 
Q1a: On a scale from 1 to 100, what is the percentage of external consultant effort in 
federal grant applications for the following years? 
Year Percentage 
FY 2009  
FY 2010  
FY 2011  
FY 2012  
  
Q1b: On a scale from 1 to 100, what is the percentage of staffing effort for the following 
years? 
Year Percentage 
FY 2009  
FY 2010  
FY 2011  
FY 2012  
 
Q2: Please state the amount your agency spent on external consultants on competitive 
grants (e.g., TIGER) application for the following years: 
Year Amount (in $) 
FY 2009  
FY 2010  
FY 2011  
FY 2012  
 
Q3: A lot of emphasis was placed on shovel readiness of projects considered for 
competitive grants (e.g., TIGER) funding. On a scale of 1 to 100, how would you rate the 
shovel readiness of the transportation projects in your state for the following years? 
Year Rate 
FY 2009  
FY 2010  
FY 2011  
FY 2012  
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Q4: State your level of agreement with the following statement: 
 
Congressional oversight of competitive grants (e.g., TIGER) funding was more intense 
than prior federal transportation grants. 
 
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
     
 
Q5: On a scale of 1 to 100, how would you rate the level of complexity of competitive 
grants (e.g., TIGER) applications in each of the following years? 
Year Rate 
FY 2009  
FY 2010  
FY 2011  
FY 2012  
 
Q6: For how many competitive grants did your agency apply (including TIGER) in the 
following years? 
Year Number 
FY 2009  
FY 2010  
FY 2011  
FY 2012  
 
 
Part 2: The following set of questions refers to your agency staff and management 
practices.  
 
Q7: For each of the following years, what percentage of your workforce approximately 
held the PE (Professional Engineer) designation? 
Year Percentage 
FY 2009  
FY 2010  
FY 2011  
FY 2012  
 
Q8: For each of the following years, approximately what percent of your management 
staff held an advanced degree (e.g., master’s, PhD or JD)? 
Year Percentage 
FY 2009  
FY 2010  
FY 2011  
FY 2012  
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Q9: For each of the following years, list the percentage of your permanent FTE agency 
workforce that is exempt from civil service protection? 
Year Percentage 
FY 2009  
FY 2010  
FY 2011  
FY 2012  
 
Q10: What percentage of your workforce voluntarily separated during the following 
years? 
Year Percentage 
FY 2009  
FY 2010  
FY 2011  
FY 2012  
 
Q11: Approximately what percentage of agency payroll was devoted to training and 
related employee development in each of the following years? 
Year Percentage 
FY 2009  
FY 2010  
FY 2011  
FY 2012  
 
Q12: Many public agencies are suffering from “a graying workforce” and subsequent 
“drain of institutional memory.” Using the scale below, how would characterize this age 
drain in your agency for the following years? 
1=insignificant 2=moderately significant 3=significant 4=very significant 5= intense 
 
Year Scale 
FY 2009  
FY 2010  
FY 2011  
FY 2012  
 
Q13: Some agencies focus on the control of expenses, others focus on efficiency, and a 
third group of agencies is more concerned with the effectiveness of their outlays. Please 
rate the importance of each by assigning a percentage weight (all weights should add to 
100%): 
Value Percentage 
Control  
Efficiency  
Effectiveness  
Total 100% 
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Q14: How would you characterize your agency performance management culture to the 
extent division level budget allocations and individual salaries are driven by objective 
achievement of results? On a scale from 1 to 100, please rate performance management 
culture of your agency for each of the following years? 
 1=last budget level and salaries are principal drivers 
 100=budget allocations and salary increases based on the achievement of 
predetermined performance levels 
Year Rate 
FY 2009  
FY 2010  
FY 2011  
FY 2012  
 
Q15: How would you assess your agency ability to track performance in real time using 
information technology? 
 Letter Grade: A B C D F 
 
Q16: Transparency is an integral part of public management. How would a citizen with a 
high-school diploma assess the transparency of your agency in term of performance 
reporting?  
 Letter Grade: A  B C D F 
 
Q17: How would an elected official assess the transparency of your agency in term of 
performance reporting?  
 Letter Grade: A  B C D F 
 
Part 3: Please answer the following question about your agency transportation 
expenditure. 
 
Q18: Please state the amount (in $) your agency spent on new construction and 
maintenance of transportation infrastructure in the following years: 
Year New construction Maintenance 
FY 2009   
FY 2010   
FY 2011   
FY 2012   
 
Please take a moment to tell us more about yourself (Optional): 
State  
Your Name  
Your Title  
Your agency  
E-mail Address  
Phone number  
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Survey Findings 
Part 1. Grant application 
1.1. External consultant vs. staffing effort (Q1) 
Year Obs. External consultant Staffing effort 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
FY 2009 15 27.53 34.93 0 90 48.07 41.56 0 100 
FY 2010 15 28.80 35.16 0 90 48.13 42.12 0 100 
FY 2011 15 30.00 37.18 0 90 46.33 43.63 0 100 
FY 2012 15 27.47 35.97 0 90 50.27 43.43 0 100 
 
1.2. Costs of external consultants (Q2) 
Year Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
FY 2009 9 548894.4 1594523 0 4800000 
FY 2010 9 554653.6 1592385 0 4800000 
FY 2011 10 495005 1512959 0 4800000 
FY 2012 10 496005 1512606 0 4800000 
 
1.3. Shovel readiness (Q3) 
Year Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
FY 2009 14 80.78571 25.54386 25 100 
FY 2010 13 78.07692 26.19625 25 100 
FY 2011 14 77.71429 27.88556 25 100 
FY 2012 13 76.84615 29.48968 18 100 
 
1.4. Perception on congressional oversight (Q4) 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
15 3.2 1.264911 1 5 
 
1.5. Complexity of competitive grants applications (Q5) 
Year Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
FY 2009 15 63.66667 16.51262 25 92 
FY 2010 14 62.14286 11.61469 50 93 
FY 2011 15 59.93333 13.23667 40 92 
FY 2012 14 58.21429 12.70481 40 93 
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Part 2. Human resource management 
2.1. PE designation (Q7) in workforce and Education level (Q8) 
Year Obs. PE designation in workforce Obs. % of advanced degree 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
FY 2009 11 13.11 10.82 3 37 10 8.49 8.72 0.6 24 
FY 2010 11 13.33 10.77 3 36.9 10 8.79 9.53 0.5 28 
FY 2011 11 13.23 10.58 3.8 36.4 10 8.64 9.31 0.4 27 
FY 2012 11 13.15 10.54 3.7 36.1 10 8.88 9.53 0.5 28 
 
2.2. Civil service protection (Q9) and voluntarily separated workforce (Q10) 
Year Obs. PE designation in workforce Obs. % of voluntary separation 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
FY 2009 14 16.34 35.69 0 100 12 12.31 22.23 3 82 
FY 2010 14 15.87 35.79 0 100 12 13.09 24.47 1.7 90 
FY 2011 14 16.07 35.80 0 100 13 13.02 22.54 2 87 
FY 2012 14 16.37 35.81 0 100 13 12.41 22.97 1 88 
 
2.3. Percentage of agency payroll regarding training and development programs (Q11) 
Year Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
FY 2009 13 3.04 3.51 0 11 
FY 2010 13 3.08 3.48 0 11 
FY 2011 13 2.99 3.50 0 11 
FY 2012 13 3.01 3.52 0 11 
 
2.4. Performance budget (Q14) 
Year Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
FY 2009 13 3.04 3.51 0 11 
FY 2010 13 3.08 3.48 0 11 
FY 2011 13 2.99 3.50 0 11 
FY 2012 13 3.01 3.52 0 11 
 
2.5. Performance management and transparency 
Question Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
IT utilization (Q15) 16 3.44 1.15 1 5 
Citizens’ assessment (Q16) 16 3.50 1.26 1 5 
Elected official’s assessment (Q17) 16 3.69 1.08 1 5 
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 Part 3. New construction vs. maintenance cost (Q18) 
Year Obs. New construction Obs. Maintenance 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
FY 2009 12 1.70  2,926.03  799.73  855.11  12 133.00  3,119.55  888.63  1,004.82  
FY 2010 12 1.70  1,951.26  741.64  737.74  12 124.00  2,685.60  812.15  867.46  
FY 2011 12 1.40  2,155.89  665.10  664.32  12 122.35  3,150.25  925.74  1,052.48  
FY 2012 12 1.40  2,169.97  724.65  801.90  12 122.34  3,819.27  976.41  1,208.65  
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